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THE NATION

JANUARY 15, 1968 35 cents

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PROTEST, POWER and THE FUTURE OF POLITICS

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The Advancement School North Carolina Kills Its Dream

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JAPAN IN ASIA'S FUTURE

W. MACMAHON BALL

After 50 Years . . . Communist Dreams and Soviet Reality

DAVID JORAVSKY / EDWARD J. BROWN / JOHN BERGER

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LETTERS

draft resisters

Cambridge, Mass.

DEAR SIRS: Readers of "After the Mobilization: The Goals of Dissent" by Lawrence Grauman, Jr. (*The Nation*, Dec. 11) may be interested to know that growing numbers within the intellectual and academic communities are publicly declaring their support for draft resisters, as did the 300 persons involved in the Conscientious Resistance action at the Justice Department on Oct. 20.

Over 1,500 persons have joined Robert McAfee Brown, Alexander Calder, William Sloane Coffin, Noam Chomsky, Paul Goodman, Arthur Miller, Ashley Montagu, Philip Roth and many other distinguished figures in signing "A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority" which urges "open" resistance to the war and the draft." RESIST, the group formed around the statement, has undertaken the job of developing a network of local adult groups which will encourage and support draft resistance throughout the nation. We are already in contact with fifty groups.

Our other immediate major objective is launching a resistance defense fund to defend those resisters who are being picked off by government in what Prof. Franz Schurmann of the University of California at Berkeley describes as "a national policy of creeping and selective repression." Besides dozens of draft-age resisters whose induction is being accelerated, several over-30 academics have been reclassified 1-A after having returned their draft cards. An evening with Norman Mailer, Robert Lowell, Noam Chomsky, Tom Hayden and others is scheduled at Town Hall in New York on Jan. 14 to raise money for support of draft resistance.

Anyone wishing information on adult support groups for draft resistance in their area should write to Room 4, 763 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, Mass., 02139.

Paul Lauter, National Director, RESIST

grateful Hungarian

Amherst, Mass.

DEAR SIRS: As one of the former editors of the Hungarian *Literary Review* mentioned by name in Robert Major's letter [*The Nation*, Nov. 27] . . . I feel it is necessary to correct some of the more misleading statements of this letter. Mr. Major "must report" that the editors of the *Literary Review* "have been aware" of the presence of the CIA in that institution "for ten years"; that they were subjected to a complete Congress for Cultural Freedom dictatorship in the person of the then chief executive, Michael Josselson; that they had to "obey" his "commands" and that—*horribile dictu!*—"Mr. Josselson was never content with the intensity of cold-war spirit the *Literary Review* displayed and threatened it with the withdrawal of funds if its anti-Communist propaganda did not become louder." Apart from hearsay, Mr. Major's main evidence is based on one particular issue of a Hungarian monthly, *Látóhatár, (Horizon)* published in Munich in 1961. Regretfully however, Mr. Major fails to mention that the editors—and sole contributors, two in number—of the said issue of *Látóhatár* had returned to Hungary soon after the publication of their pamphlet and, having thus "unmasked," in the best possible *Agitprop* tradition, their former friends and foes became—and still are—the loyal propagandists of the official party line. . . .

The truth is that wherever the funds came from or whatever disagreements we had among ourselves or with Mr. Josselson, the editorial policy was neither influenced nor dictated, let alone commanded, by anyone but our conscience. The truth is that we edited and published an

(Continued on page 84)

EDITORIALS

The Second Centennial

That the American Republic is young is one of those half-truths that becomes incontrovertible by repetition. Actually, ours is not only the most powerful of republics but probably the oldest in continuity of tenure. Yet in terms of the European history which is also part of our history, ours is not an old country. In 1976 it will be celebrating only its second centennial. The event is close to our present year of troubles. This is an election year; four years later, another Presidential, and then the second centennial.

One thing is certain: it will be far different from the first. Henry Adams looked at the primitive dynamo-electric machinery of the period (it would be another five years before Thomas A. Edison began generating commercial power in New York City) and speculated on the third law of thermodynamics, which deals with the increasing unavailability of heat energy (but the secrets of the atom were still unknown). The medieval period was held together by faith in the Virgin, Adams thought; he was less sure about what had held the American Republic together for a century and enabled it to survive a devastating war. Yet the spirit of the age was on the whole optimistic. Even the terrible financial panic of 1873 had not inflicted a lasting trauma.

We cannot say as much for ourselves. As one year ends and another begins, a publicly hopeful spirit is an obligation that custom has imposed on commentators, whatever hangups and hangovers they may endure in private. But 1967 was an exception, the only one that most of us can remember. Those who not only harbored, but expressed, grave doubts were not professional pessimists. *The Nation*'s "Sense of Crisis" editorial of November 13, 1967, was a reflection of a growing apprehension not about this or that surmountable threat but about our ability as a people to cope with the harsh realities of the age, to admit and correct errors, to escape the *hubris* that had brought ruin on nations less fortunate, or less wise, than ours. *The Wall Street Journal*'s November 8 report on "Capital Malaise," about which we commented on December 4 ("Scavengers of the Press"), made painful reading because it expressed truths which were in themselves painful.

And what now? This, with a Washington January 1, 1968, dateline: "We are in deep trouble as a people. And history is not going to deal kindly with a rich nation that will not tax itself to cure its miseries." That was John W. Gardner speaking, a Republican, though Lyndon B. Johnson's Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. Marjorie Hunter, the *New York Times* reporter who wrote the story, commented on the contrast between the annual flow of glowing reports on the state of the nation as the year wanes, and the frustration of probably most, if not all, of the members of the Cabinet over the budget squeeze at a time of severe domestic ills—the incredibly rapid decay of the cities, urban riots and the threat of more to come, the rising crime rate, surface traffic congestion mounting faster than roads can be built,

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dangerous traffic congestion around the major airports, water and air pollution, the shortage of doctors and nurses, spiraling medical costs and the obsolescence of a large part of the nation's hospital facilities, and all the other symptoms of a society that is sick, knows it is sick, and can think of nothing but crowding as much pleasure into individual and family living as can be bought for cash or credit. Whatever may betide, we should honor Gardner for sparing us the platitudes and speaking his mind without looking over his shoulder at the President or anyone else who might find his observations unpleasant.

Even the humorists have stopped laughing—at least those who always had something serious to say while they were being funny—people like Dick Gregory, that is, rather than Bob Hope. E. B. White is one of these borderline commentators whom it is perilous for a nation to take lightly, and in the next to the last 1967 issue of *The New York Times* he let us have it. "What happened?" he asked. "What went sour? What did I do wrong? Who's to blame?" "I am," White concluded. "I am to blame." In a sense that is true; none of us is free from guilt, either as individuals or in our connections with institutions. But an indictment so broad becomes inactionable. Surely the young man who goes to jail in protest against the Vietnamese War is not as blameworthy as the President of the United States who gratuitously pushed us deep into that abominable conflict. Some distinctions are in order.

"I believe," says Mr. White, "our principles are sound and good." Fine: but if we give only lip service to those good principles, how can we expect to be saved? If we are obstinate hypocrites, *should* we be saved? Economic self-interest, with every man for himself, was not such a bad idea in 1776; America was a big open country with a wide-open frontier. But this is our day, not Thomas Jefferson's. If, then, we value the Republic, we must change with the times. We must take a more critical look at the technology that we now revere perhaps more than is good either for it or for us, since the bulk of it is devoted to weaponry and its product advances are in the realm of mass murder. If we can make this effort, our second centennial may still be something to be proud of. If we cannot, there may be no second centennial.

What We Do Not Need

No doubt suffering from year's-end fatigue, the generally perceptive James Reston offers a suggestion which should be promptly and firmly rejected. In essence he proposes, since the parties and candidates have let us down, that a government of national union be formed. This is precisely what the country does *not* need.

Since the end of World War II we have had a form of coalition government — in the sense, that is, of a strongly supported "bipartisan" foreign policy. This bipartisan concept is largely responsible for the fact that we now find it so difficult to reverse or modify a policy which has had strong support from both sides of the Congress for twenty years (see article p. 71). But we have had a form of coalition government in a more specific sense since 1960. President Kennedy named two Republicans to key Cabi-

IN THIS ISSUE

January 15, 1968

EDITORIALS

66

ARTICLES

71 Protest, Power and the Future of Politics
Carey McWilliams

77 The Advancement School: North Carolina Kills Its Dream
David Cooper

80 *Los Angeles Times:* Most Likely To Succeed
Phil Kerby

82 Japan in Asia's Future
W. Macmahon Ball

BOOKS & THE ARTS

85 Communist Dreams and Soviet Reality — *David Joravsky*
86 Stories of a Soviet Writer — *Edward J. Brown*
88 In the Beginning There Was Art — *John Berger*
92 Theatre — *Harold Clurman*
93 Tragic Cakewalk — *Julius Novick*
94 Films — *Robert Hatch*
95 Crossword Puzzle — *Frank W. Lewis*

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The Nation is published weekly (except biweekly in July and August) by the Nation Magazine Company and copyright 1968 in the U.S.A. by the Nation Associates, Inc., 333 Sixth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10014. Tel.: CH 2-8400. West Coast office (for editorial correspondence only): 1256 Westwood Boulevard, Los Angeles, Calif. 90024. Tel.: GR 4-2533. Second class postage paid at New York, N. Y. and at additional mailing office.

Subscription Price: One year, $10; two years, $18. Foreign and Canadian postage: $1 extra per year.

Change of Address: It is essential that subscribers ordering a change of address give five weeks' notice and provide their old as well as their new address. Please give Zip Code numbers for both addresses.

Information to Libraries: The Nation is indexed in Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature, Book Review Digest, Book Review Index and the Public Affairs Information Service.

THE NATION *Volume 206*
No. 3

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net posts: Douglas Dillon to the Treasury, Robert S. McNamara to Defense. President Johnson has two Republicans in the Cabinet: McNamara and John W. Gardner. Under Kennedy, and even more under Johnson, Sen. Everett Dirksen, nominally the Republican leader in the Senate, has served as an ardent Administration spokesman on critical foreign policy issues. In general, Johnson has relied heavily on Republican support for his policies in Vietnam; he has enjoyed the endorsements of such GOP leaders as General Eisenhower, Richard M. Nixon, and, until recently at least, Gov. Nelson Rockefeller.

When President Roosevelt formed what was in effect a coalition government by adding Stimson and Knox to the Cabinet, it was for an excellent reason: to fight and win a world war that was clearly in the offing. The need now is not to fight and win a world war but to avoid one. What is needed now is not consensus but conflict; a clash of opinion, live options. Sen. Eugene McCarthy has said that he hopes to end what he calls the electorate's "joyless spirit—a mood of frustration . . . the sense of political helplessness." Ending that frustration is the commanding national political priority.

Mr. Reston has said as much himself in his column of December 10 entitled "The Fatalism of American Politics," in which he inveighed against a system that may offer the voters a "choice" between President Johnson and Richard M. Nixon. The people have not "abdicated," as Arthur Miller suggested recently; they have simply not had a choice. The major interest groups, like the voters generally, are frustrated because their leadership, as in the case of AFL-CIO, is heavily committed to the President. But we now know, thanks to Dr. George Gallup (January 2) that 43 per cent of labor's membership regards the Vietnamese War as an error. Much the same state of affairs prevails in other mass organizations. "Total consensus," as August Heckscher pointed out in a recent article in *The American Scholar,* "and total war constitute, in the last analysis, an ugly and inseparable pair." The nearer we have come to total consensus among the leadership elements, the nearer we have come to total war. The remedy is to end what Emmet John Hughes has called "the great disfranchisement" (*Newsweek,* January 8). A Presidential encounter among Johnson, Nixon and Wallace, though a national political disaster, would reflect in a way a "national union" or consensus approach on the one key issue, the war. But that trio of candidates would not produce unity; it would sow the seeds of profound disunity and dissension. "The most obvious way to make democracy work," as Mr. Heckscher sensibly concludes, ". . . would be to get the question of Vietnam openly and fairly into the political campaign, so that the voters might have a choice of policy."

The Year of Japan's Emergence

After twenty years of skillfully avoiding the spotlight in Asian and world affairs, without making a single false move, Japan is now beginning to emerge from the wings. During the period of economic recovery after World War II, Japan adopted a cautious and tactful approach in its foreign policy. But now that the booming Japanese economy is making headlines all over the world, its diplomacy is gathering momentum. "There can be no doubt today of the potential Japanese presence," writes Jon Halliday in *New Left Review* (July-August, 1967). "From Calcutta to Sakhalin and down to Tasmania, Japan is on the scene—in economic matters already very much an independent agent. The logic of this must produce its political effect." And, indeed, this effect is now being registered.

The rapid economic recovery of Japan is, like that of West Germany, one of those "miracles" that, on close scrutiny, is less miraculous than it has been made out to be. First of all, the Korean War was an economic windfall; Japan is thought to have made more than $2 billion out of this U.S. "police action." By 1951, Japan's industrial output was already more than equal to what it had been twenty years before; like West Germany, it has benefited from "the generosity of victors."

Then the war in Vietnam came along just in time to add real zip to the Japanese economy which had begun to lag a bit. Directly or indirectly, Japan earned $1 billion from the war in 1967. Buoyed up by this increased business, Japan's annual growth rate soared to 7.5 per cent in 1966. But the war in Vietnam has also given an enormous impetus to the South Korean economy and in the two years since diplomatic relations were restored between Japan and South Korea, Japan has practically replaced the United States as the No. 1 outside power in the South Korean economy. And all this time Japan has, of course, been keeping defense costs at a minimum while enjoying the protection of the American "nuclear umbrella." For example, whereas defense costs have been about 6.5 per cent of GNP in Great Britain, they have, until recently, been only about 1.27 per cent in Japan. Today Japan is about to become the third industrial power in the world. It is the only capitalist country in which the United States does not dominate either the oil, steel, automobile or electronic industries. It has a thoroughly rationalized economic system in which state initiative has given the bureaucracy a powerful role in the government; state control over both the accumulation and investment of capital has generated a financial tradition and a banking system quite different from anything in the West. The visionary Herman Kahn has suggested that around the turn of the century Japan will pass the United States in GNP per capita.

From the outset Japan has been a key factor in this country's "strategic thinking," although it is seldom mentioned in the public debate. In a recent interview, General Eisenhower referred briefly to the significance of Japan in relation to Vietnam and then added, as an aside, "probably the less said about that right now the better." Were we to be explicit about the extent to which Japan figures in our strategic thinking on Vietnam, it might inflame Japanese opinion and create a general uneasiness throughout Southeast Asia. For Washington has thought of Japan not merely as a "partner" in Asia but as a potential stand-in or military surrogate for us once the war is over. "No concern of the United States in the Pacific," to quote from the recent statement by fourteen scholars on the war (*The New York Times, December* 20), "is more vital than that Japan's emerging initiative in

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foreign policy should be exercised in such a way as to utilize her enormous potentials in support of world peace and prosperity." In a sense, we have been fighting in Vietnam until Japan was in a position, and of a mind, to take over some of our "responsibilities" in the Pacific. In the meantime, so the argument has run, South Vietnam must not be permitted to fall into "unfriendly hands," since if this were to happen, Japan might be denied access to the markets and raw materials of Southeast Asia and the sea lanes to Japan might be endangered. In effect, what we have done is to underwrite Japan's position in the "co-prosperity sphere" for which it fought World War II.

But rather acute problems have arisen. For one thing, the Japanese people are clearly anti-war (see article p. 82) and are not eager to see Japan rearmed. For another, the Vietnamese War has subjected the Japanese, as Keyes Beech noted in a dispatch to the Chicago *Daily News* (November 28), to a great emotional strain. They have been making so much money out of the war that they have now begun to fear what might happen if it were to end. A committee of inquiry that was sent recently to South Vietnam reported on the possible "detrimental influences" that might result from peace talks (Washington *Star,* May 10, 1967). As an offset, the Japanese Government has begun to talk about the necessity of rearming. Already it is being suggested that the Japanese must overcome their "nuclear allergy," and the Minister of Education has suggested that pupils at the primary and junior high school levels should be taught "defense consciousness."

More recently, Premier Sato told the Japanese that they must accept the presence of nuclear arms on their soil if they want to regain control of Okinawa. There is agitation to substitute the words "army," "navy" and "air force" for the euphemistic "Self-Defense Forces" and to elevate the Japanese Defense Agency to the status of a full-fledged ministry. Actually many of the weapons used in the SDF arsenals right now are "dual weapons"—that is, they can be fitted with conventional or atomic warheads. More and more, right-wing officers in Japan are saying that Japan's "first line of defense" is the 38th Parallel in Korea and the 17th Parallel in Vietnam. Clearly, Washington is encouraging the Japanese to subvert the Constitution we imposed on them, Article 9 of which forbids the maintenance of land, sea and air forces. Because even today Japan's "self-defense forces," combined, constitute the largest non-Communist military force in Asia.

No doubt we have thought that Japan, as a junior partner, would protect our interests as well as its own. But Japan, which is celebrating the centennial of the Meiji Restoration, is beginning to think about Japanese interests. In the end, will the partner outgrow the partnership? In trying to contain China, have we made it difficult to contain Japan? If Washington has any misgivings on this score, it has not voiced them. But even now the renewal of the Security Agreement, which will be up for discussion in 1970, has begun to cast a slight cloud on U.S. Japanese relations. Before then, no doubt, the Japanese will want to improve their bargaining position.

A Gun (or Two) in Every Home

Everyone has heard about the Minutemen, those quaint characters who confuse 1776 with 1968 and feel sure that if enough firearms are put in the hands of staunch Americans the Republic can be saved. The guns are to be used on the Communists, who have infiltrated almost everything, and who, at some juncture, not too far off, will have to be stopped with cold steel and hot lead. Most rational Americans tend to dismiss the Minutemen and similar vigilante groups as the lunatic fringe of patriotism. This attitude may be too complacent. The conviction that guns will cure the country's ills is gaining currency in what Richard Hofstadter calls the paranoid style in American politics.

A grand jury in Nashville, Tenn., has just come up with the recommendation that a gun is as indispensable in the American home as a refrigerator and self-cleaning oven, and spiritually far more important. The citizens must arm, and both amateur and professional police must be recruited in great numbers. Addressing the Chicago City Council, Boss Daley promised that nothing would be allowed to disturb the deliberations of the Democrats during the coming hot summer. He got loud cheers and a standing ovation, and an assurance that if 5,000 more policemen were needed, the council would see that he got them.

In fact, there is a boom both on policemen and on do-it-yourself shooting in the name of law and order. In New York City the head of the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association has been assailing the Mayor because he has not consented to add another 5,000 men to the force. In Miami, Police Chief Walter E. Headley defended his "new" get-tough policy in the Negro district, and area in which fifty-eight crimes of violence were allegedly committed over the Christmas weekend. The Chief's remedy was shotguns, police dogs and a stop-and-frisk ordinance. The five-member police commission includes one Negro; she expressed some concern about the stop-and-frisk law. Another member criticized the Chief's "inflammatory" manner. "We don't mind being accused of police brutality," the Chief commented. "They haven't seen anything yet."

Later, the Miami office of the American Civil Liberties Union said it would seek an injunction in federal court against Headley's plan, but the Chief is very popular in white Miami, where he rides on horseback in the Orange Bowl parades. He argues, also, that in his way he is an integrationist: 10 per cent of the Miami police force is now Negro.

At the year-end meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, a speaker at one of the conferences on riots and urban mass violence suggested that what was needed was not more repression but study of such factors as racism, *status-quo* power, methods of achieving a just society, and similar aspects of social conflict. But why bother with such subtleties? A gun in every home, and a tough pair of cops in every squad car, are much simplier, much faster, and much more appealing to the he-man psychology of the TV-conditioned public. Of course it won't work, but it will satisfy a lot of tough-minded citizens while it is failing.

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A Little Union-Busting?

It seems hard to believe, but some 60,000 copper workers have been on strike since July, 1967, and the end is not in sight. The union accepted a proposal by the Administration for a joint fact-finding board, but the industry turned it down. Essentially, this is a strike to secure for copper workers standards comparable to those prevailing in rubber, automobiles, aluminum and other industries. The background is that one of the few surviving left-wing unions, the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, waged a well-nigh ruinous fight for years with the United Steelworkers, much to the pleasure of the industry; but when the two unions fianlly merged the strike began promptly. In all, twenty-six unions are involved in the present strike, although the Steelworkers are predominant. The unions are demanding joint negotiations on a company-by-company basis, and a common termination date.

The strike has cut perhaps 75 per cent of domestic copper production, but enough of the metal flows in from Canada, Chile, Peru, Zambia, the Congo and other places (in addition to domestic sources of copper scrap) so that fabrication can continue without placing insupportable strains on the producers. Phelps-Dodge, Anaconda, Kennecott and American Smelting & Refining do not live from hand to mouth, as a lot of the workers do.

All in all, the outlook is unpleasant. Consumer prices rose almost 3 per cent in 1967 and far more in some fields; medical costs, for instance, were almost 8 per cent higher in November than a year earlier. Then, Social Security takes a sizable bite out of the worker's pay, and while this is for his long-term benefit, it is, as everyone knows, hardly more than a simulacrum of real social security. As in the case of executives, it must be supplemented by pensions. The men are less interested in wage increases, which they know will be swallowed up by rising taxes and the cost of living, than in job security and retirement benefits. They keep on fighting for these vital needs. In the meantime, what the strike does in a copper town like Bisbee, Ariz., (population about 10,000) is no small matter. The economy limps along with the loss of $1 million a month in payroll income.

If 1968 should produce a Congress less friendly to labor than last year's legislature, some managements might think they saw a golden opportunity to keep wages and fringe benefits down and profits up. If so, more troubles will be added to those that LBJ already has. It is something for him to think about, and the sooner the better.

The Class Struggle On TV

We are all aware that though the United States is a perfect democracy, we do have economic classes. Rightly regarded, this is one of the glories of our free-enterprise system, since it impels the inhabitants of the ghetto to strive to get out of it and live in luxury apartments. In one respect, however, we have until recently been virtually a classless society. Television has been the democratic form of entertainment for all, ranging from the family on welfare to the wealthy household, convinced that its taxes should not be paying for the welfare television sets. All alike have laughed synchronously at the same jokes from the same comedians, and hated the wicked Reds who were shooting at our boys in Vietnam.

Now an advertising section folded into *The New York Times* reminds us that technology never pauses and is about to provide the denizens of the slums with an additional incentive to become industrialists. "New York needs help," the insertion declares, and most New Yorkers will agree. However, the present jeremiad isn't over crime in the streets or hippies or air pollution: it's poor TV reception—ghosts, double images, "snow," flip-flopping and similar horrors. The solution is to let the masses continue to get their TV through the air, while the classes receive it via coaxial cable, which is not subject to radio frequency interference and video noise.

Ten thousand New Yorkers are already enjoying this boon. Manhattan Island has been divided for cable TV between Manhattan Cable Television, which has the franchise south of East 86th and West 79th, and Teleprompter, which operates north of that boundary. Teleprompter will therefore be serving Negro and Puerto Rican Harlem, but since cable TV costs $19.95 for installation and $5 a month thereafter for a single outlet, it is not likely that facilities will be overtaxed in the ghetto. On the other hand, we are assured by Mr. Armand Lindenbaum, president of Pease and Elliman, Inc., that prospective luxury apartment tenants will soon be turning up their noses at buildings that are not equipped with cable TV.

Perfect pictures are not all that the fortunate cable patrons can look forward to. Turn the VHF tuning dial of your receiver. Even in New York City, which is pretty well saturated with TV, you will note that only seven of these twelve precious channels produce a picture. Cable TV has eliminated the intolerable waste. Since there is no question of inter-city interference, cable TV provides "Weatherama" on one of these channels, continuous news on another, stock market reports on a third ("It's like having a stock ticker in your living room") and other necessities of the good life. And that's only a beginning. One of these closed-circuit channels will tell cable TV patrons where to eat and what shows to go to, and guide them to all the glamorous happenings of the metropolis. "Over the horizon," we are assured, "are the possibilities of many additional services to be available via cable—ordering tonight's dinner from the supermarket, retrieving information from a computer center, banking by electronics and many another wonder."

Obviously that $5 a month is only part of the income that the TV cable capitalists expect to harvest. The pair of wires that now brings telephone service into your home is likened to a one-horse bridle path, while the coaxial cable is a six-lane highway opened up between you and some high-powered sales interests. The latter are not small operators: Manhattan Cable Television, for instance, is partly owned by Time/Life. Already 5 million viewers in 1,800 communities throughout the United States are patrons of cable TV. Soon a pair of extended rabbit ears or, worse, an outside antenna, will be a mark of social disgrace. Only one thing Harlem and Park Avenue will still have in common—the commercials. That is the one form of interference that cable TV cannot eliminate.

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PROTEST, POWER AND THE FUTURE OF POLITICS

CAREY McWILLIAMS

A preoccupation with power—black power, student power, flower power, poor power, "the power structure"—is the most striking aspect of the American political scene at the moment. Oddly enough, obsession with power goes hand in hand with a fear of power. Some of the New Left groups that talk the toughest about power are extremely reluctant to see power operate in institutional form; within their own organizations, they shun "hierarchies" and formally structured relations of authority. What the preoccupation with power reflects, essentially, is a deep-seated, pervasive feeling of powerlessness. The feeling is not restricted to particular groups; most citizens, a majority perhaps, are bedeviled by it. "A feeling of having no choice," Mary McCarthy has noticed, "is becoming more and more widespread in American life."

So intense is the feeling of powerlessness that it has given rise to "anti-movements" and "anti-politics." Instead of building new, strong, viable organizations through which to exercise political power, the tendency—at least on the Left—has been to move in the reverse direction, that is, to reject the instruments of politics. Discussion has been superseded by "uproar," debate by demonstrations, dialogue by confrontation, civil disobedience by overt resistance. Often in the past, young voters have bade "farewell to reform" and then turned to radical politics; this time they have swung toward no politics at all. The idea of government by and through elected representatives is seriously questioned by some and indignantly rejected by others. The very process of politics has come under direct attack from young and old alike.

Apart from increasing evidence of this active disaffection, there is among those who have by no means despaired of politics a widespread anxiety about what Walter Lippmann has called "the rot of the American political system." On November 10, N.B.C. presented an analysis of voter attitudes on the 1968 election, and found that most voters had little faith that any major candidate for the Presidency could master either of the two major problems we face (war and race), and worse, seemed to feel that the electorate was being denied live options on most issues. The survey indicated "a stunning lack of confidence in the President and in his political opponents." A mountain of supporting evidence might be cited. Yet despite the active disaffection and the mounting general concern, little attention has been focused on what it is that accounts basically for the malfunctioning of the political system. The problem has two aspects. Power has been concentrated in our society in such a way, and to such a degree, that normal political processes are perhaps no longer able to cope with it. But one can't be sure of that because if certain specific weaknesses in the political system not directly related to the concentration of power, were remedied (at the moment they are not widely recognized, much less discussed) the reform might go far to remove the "rot" from the system.

On the first aspect, that of power, Thomas C. Cochran, the economic historian, has reminded us that "the modern centralized, militarized, and welfare-directed state" did not come into being overnight; it is the result of a complex internal evolution. Not consciously planned, it is a response to fears: first of internal economic collapse; second of external dangers and "enemies." The New Deal, a war against impending economic collapse, was fought as any war is fought. Emergency agencies, with extraordinary powers, came into being overnight; crash programs were rushed into motion; executive decisions took precedence over cumbersome legislative processes; and more and more power was vested in the Presidency. At the same time, and as part of the same process, economic power was increasingly concentrated. On the eve of World War II, a study made by a group including six members of President Roosevelt's Cabinet ("The Structure of the American Economy," 1939), expressed, even then, growing alarm at the political consequences of tightly held economic power.

The concentration of power became much tighter after we entered World War II. Under the stress of rapid mobilization, a remarkable fusion of economic and political power took place; more accurately, perhaps, a fusion of economic and administrative or Executive power. This had been true also in World War I, but unlike the procedure after 1918, the war-making machine of World War II was never fully dismantled. The swift onset of the cold war, then the fighting in Korea and Vietnam, set the pattern for a permanent war economy. The rapid pace of military technology, which began to diverge sharply from civilian advances, created a political rationale for continuous research and improvement in weapons systems and the like. Nuclear weapons and virtually instantaneous delivery systems authorized an ever-larger permanent military establishment; in any future war, it was said, there would be "no time to mobilize." In the past, industries had "converted" to war production and then "reconverted" to peacetime production. After 1945 new defense industries came into being specifically to manufacture military hardware. At the same time the magnitude of the military budget revolutionized government finance. Defense-related expenditures will this year probably exceed $100 billion. In a recent survey, the AP referred to the Pentagon as wielding "the mightiest concentration of economic power in the world today."

In his famous farewell address, General Eisenhower expressed misgivings about our ability to control "the military-industrial complex" by normal political processes. More recently, the same concern has been more specifically voiced by others. "The huge size of military budgets,"

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said Dr. Arthur F. Burns, "and incomplete disclosure concerning their management, carry with them the dangers of political abuse"—as by building military stockpiles of certain raw materials to maintain price levels during periods of overproduction or of stepping up defense spending as an offset to declining employment. Dr. Charles J. Hitch, an expert on defense planning, now president of the University of California, has made a similar observation: "Certainly the defense budget is a large and powerful tool for the government, and one is tempted to seek its uses to solve an array of problems. . . . Defense spending has become a substantial and more or less normal factor in the economic reckoning of many American businesses."

Senator Fulbright spoke most soberly on this point in the Senate on December 13:

> More and more our economy, our government and our universities are adapting themselves to the requirements of continuing war—total war, limited war and cold war. The struggle against militarism into which we were drawn twenty-six years ago has become permanent, and for the sake of conducting it, we are making ourselves into a militarized society . . . For all the inadvertency of its creation and the innocent intentions of its participants, it [the military-industrial-academic complex] has become a powerful new force for the perpetuation of foreign military commitments, for the introduction and expansion of expensive weapons systems and, as a result, for the militarization of large segments of our national life. Most interest groups are counterbalanced by other interest groups, but the defense complex is so much larger than any other that there is no effective counterweight to it except concern as to its impact on the part of some of our citizens and a few of our leaders, none of whom have material incentive to offer.

For this reason, the defense complex has not been challenged by either party; in fact both have been about equally responsible for it. But it is doubtful that the growth of the complex could have been arrested even if one of the major parties had been willing to incur the risk of such a stand. And it is doubtful today that the Republican Party can bring itself to challenge the disastrous course of present policies, not because it is blind to the dangers or fails to appreciate the political possibilities in capitalizing on the existing discontent, but because power is now so bipartisan in structure that the opposition party cannot, apparently, muster the resources or the will to make the effort. James Reston notes, moreover, that the powerful Eastern Establishment in the GOP is by no means unanimously displeased with Johnson and his policies.

As the militarization of the society has proceeded, the power of the Congress relative to the Presidency has steadily declined. The recent report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on "National Commitments" (November 20) points out that the last twenty years have seen a nearly complete reversal of the positions of the Executive and legislative branches in the area of foreign affairs. Dr. Ruhl Bartlett, of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, told the committee that "the greatest danger to democracy in the United States and to the freedom of its people and to their welfare—as far as foreign affairs are concerned—is the erosion of legislative authority and oversight and the growth of a vast pyramid of centralized power in the Executive branch of the government." Dr. Edgar Eugene Robinson of Stanford suggested in a recent speech that the acquisition by the President of immense power over foreign affairs during the last twenty years means that the Constitution is outdated. "There is no possibility," he says, "of real change in the President's foreign policy except by removal . . . by death, resignation, impeachment or defeat at the polls." What in his view makes this development particularly dangerous is the dexterity with which the President can fuse two constitutional functions: his role as commander in chief and his responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs. Once war has become an instrument of national policy, it is hard to tell which role a President is playing. If his foreign policy is challenged, he can always assert his powers as commander in chief, and these powers are almost unlimited. (See, also, Sen. Frank Church's speech, October 29, on "President and Congress in Foreign Policy: The Threat to Constitutional Government.")

The process by which political and economic power have been concentrated through expansion of the war-making machine has been hastened by a series of post-war "revolutions": the organizational revolution, the scientific and technological revolution, the cybernetic revolution and, most notably, the communications revolution. As Dr. Robinson also pointed out, the communications revolution has made it possible for a new Presidential order, decision or proclamation to be carried instantaneously by radio and television. "Consequently, the effectiveness of that action is amplified millions of times by the miracle of swift communication."

Over the past twenty years the power of appropriation, which is supposed to be the bedrock of Congressional control, has been seriously eroded. A study of how the military budget has been handled in successive Congresses since the end of World War II would demonstrate that it is now firmly controlled by the Executive. And the military budget is today so immense, particularly if expenditures for NASA and the AEC are included, that the power to manipulate it conveys, as a side effect, power to shape the whole national budget.

The fallacy in the guns-and-butter proposition, as Dr. Burns has pointed out, is that "Financial transactions and the price system are merely mechanisms for putting a nation's resources to work and for distributing what is produced among people and their government. The resources that we devote to national defense are not available for making consumer goods or for adding to the stock of industrial equipment or for public uses in the sphere of education, health, or urban development. To the extent that we allocate labor, materials, and capital to national defense, we cannot satisfy our desires for

> The discussion of the crisis in the American political system, begun last week with Eldon Kenworthy's "Peace Politics: A Calculus for '68," and extended by this comment, will be pursued further next week with an article by Edward Schneier of Princeton University, "Toward a New Politics: A Look Beyond the 1968 Elections." *Editors*

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other things. . . . Bombs or missiles add nothing to a nation's capacity to produce, while new equipment serves to augment production in the future. The real cost of the defense sector consists, therefore, not only of the civilian goods and services that are currently foregone on its account; it includes also an element of growth that could have been achieved through larger investment in human or business capital." In fact a former member of President Eisenhower's Council of Economic Advisers, Dr. Paul McCracken, has expressed the opinion that the Executive's seizure of decision-making has resulted in a federal budget whose expenditures, in the technical sense, are now out of control.

Any erosion of the power of Congress is an erosion of the power of the people. Given a society in which for a period of twenty years—almost the span of a generation—the real power of decision has been increasingly ceded to the President, it is not hard to account for the prevalent sense of "powerlessness." Just as the ghetto dweller feels that he lives in "occupied territory," so many people come to feel that they have been "displaced" from their role as electors. A force which they cannot control or directly influence has taken charge of their lives and destinies. "There are many signs," writes A. H. Halsey (*New Society*, October 26), "from love-ins in the Haight-Ashbury district of San Francisco to the 'privitization' of affluent workers . . . that a theory of the impotence of politics is being accepted." If the country has in fact been "occupied" by a power not sanctioned by the Constitution, then it must be "liberated." But given the degree to which power has been concentrated, can the direction of policy be reversed by conventional political means? In such a situation, public protests become increasingly directed against the symbols of power, and that has the effect of diverting energies from the political process and, at the same time, discrediting it.

Herblock, The Washington Post

"I'm Afraid To Look"

In the nature of things, it is difficult for "anti-movements" to cooperate with movements—of any kind. The objectives, the sense of tactics, the style of action, are different or divergent. That some of the "anti-movements" share with the infinitely larger movement of "concerned" and "dissatisfied" citizens the short-term objective of stopping the war does not mean that they see the war in the same terms or that they agree on other objectives. The "anti-movement" of Negro nationalists does not even share the short-term objective of stopping the war (at least, it is not for them a priority objective). And, to complicate matters, the larger movement is itself not well organized and lacks sufficient program.

By and large, "anti-movements" are not elated when a dove defeats a hawk; they have lost confidence in the political process as it now exists—not without reason—and they want to discredit it, the better, no doubt, to fill the political vacuum with a new politics. If the "anti-movements" openly espoused revolutionary objectives, then a measure of "parallel" politics might be possible (it may still be, depending on developments). But as of now, the Black Nationalists and the New Activists, as William Appleman Williams has observed, "have no vision of a Socialist commonwealth, let alone even the beginnings of serious proposals to create and govern such a society." They seem less concerned with the concentration of power, and the growing political vacuum which could set the stage for an American fascism, than with the hateful discrepancy between liberal ideals and liberal practice. They give little thought to the possibility that something about the functioning of a capitalist economy may lead to the concentration of power. The heroes of the "anti-movements" are Debray and Che Guevara, not Gramsci who thought that the proper place to find those who aspired to lead revolutionary movements was in the reading rooms of public libraries. Because they are not really concerned with the *political* consequences of particular protests and demonstrations, they discount polls which show that certain recent demonstrations have stimulated a reaction and strengthened the President's hand. This, of course, is a logical attitude for those who have lost confidence in the political process. But it carries a distressing echo of the "social fascism" line that the Communist Party pursued in the early 1930s.

However, the "anti-movements" have had some highly desirable political consequences. The stress on personal commitment, on values, on life styles, the exposure of liberal pretense, have released new energies, focused attention on particular issues, and pointed up the relation between morality and politics. One of the only means whereby individuals can make what they think and feel relevant in a society in which power is highly concentrated is to stress the morality—or immorality—of public policies. But it is precisely in such a period that as

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Iris Murdoch has noted, "political moralizing comes to be thought of as an idle idealism, a sort of utopianizing which is just a relief from looking at unpleasant facts." This was the position into which many cold-war liberals were driven, or into which they retreated, when they decided that there was little point in attempting to bring moral judgments to bear in the field of foreign policy. Today many of these same individuals have recoiled in horror from the consequences of the "crackpot realism" of Dulles and Acheson and Rusk. For this shift in attitude, the "anti-movements" are entitled to some credit. But if we are to answer the cynic in ourselves, moral judgments, as Miss Murdoch stresses, must be *realistic enough* to be political judgments as well. For the ultimate cynicism is to conclude that politics is a futile game. Such a conclusion severs the relation between morality and politics. To stress the immorality of the war in Vietnam, while rejecting the possibility of stopping it *by political means*, is self-defeating. Before anyone declared politics obsolete, he should at least try to identify the rot which has brought such discredit upon the institution.

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Perhaps the most important single cause of the rot has been adherence to a bipartisan foreign policy. Politics does *not* stop at the water's edge. In today's world, one might well say that it begins there. The American party system had its origins in a dispute over foreign policy. The bipartisan concept dates from Roosevelt's determination to secure ratification of the UN charter by obtaining Republican support in advance. But the cold war came along almost before the Charter had been ratified, and what had been projected as a temporary expedient crystallized as a national dogma. The policy that resulted has been one of preserving the *status quo,* of pushing American economic expansion throughout the world under cover of a rigid "anti-Communist" ideology. At the same time the fear of communism—in part real, in part concocted—made it relatively easy to wrest cold-war appropriations from Congress, particularly military appropriations. Since the major interest groups all benefited directly or indirectly—if not evenly—they became adherents to bipartisan cold-war policies and the country, enjoying the prolonged boom, acquiesced.

Given the generally conservative cast of successive postwar Congresses, the emphasis on military spending in support of mostly reactionary cold-war policies won majority bipartisan support. For one thing, it was a way of keeping domestic spending for welfare and other purposes under control. Then, as military spending increased, the influence of the military on foreign policy also increased, as did the power of the President. The public hearings which the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staged in 1966 are generally conceded to represent the first significant attempt by that committee in the postwar period to regain some of the power it once possessed. Not to debate foreign policy assumptions and alternatives was, in today's world, to forgo significant debate on domestic issues as well. It was as though both parties had agreed to a twenty-year moratorium on significant politics. Today the rot that this moratorium produced is all too evident.

But there are signs—and they are multiplying—that the bipartisan consensus is breaking up. Senator Morton's dramatic announcement last summer—"I was wrong. Our country has been painted into a corner out there. There's going to have to be a change"—was an event of major political importance. Since then, as Don Oberdorfer points out in *The New York Times Magazine* (December 17), the "wobble" on Capitol Hill has become increasingly evident. "The summer and fall of 1967 have been a time of switching . . . a scurrying in many directions, in search of a stance that took account of the growing distaste for the war." The splendid spadework on Vietnam undertaken by a 29-year-old freshman Republican, Rep. Donald W. Riegle, Jr., and some of his colleagues is a sign that the twenty-year infatuation with bipartisan cold-war policies is beginning to lose its appeal to Republicans. Never before have so many dissenting voices begun to link foreign affairs with domestic politics (Dr. Martin Luther King is an example), which suggests that in the end the crisis in domestic affairs will force a reconsideration of foreign policy. But even as the ferment spreads, efforts are made to reimpose the "consensus," to choke off partisan debate before it gets started. General Eisenhower has said that any Republican who departs from the official line on Vietnam "will have me to contend with. . . . That's one of the few things that would start me off on a series of stump speeches across the nation"—a statement not calculated to encourage the Republicans to offer an alternative policy and program. However, increasing numbers of Republicans continue to "wobble."

Adherence to a bipartisan foreign policy was made all the easier when the Left collapsed after World War II. By Left, I mean all those elements that might have been disposed to challenge the assumptions on which the cold-war policy rested. Twenty years of systematic redbaiting, conducted not by private but by government agencies, and financed by public funds, gravely distorted the political spectrum; it shifted the center of gravity in both parties well to the right. The Left, in the European sense, was never strong here; during the McCarthy phase it ceased to exist. Nor was this merely a matter of disrupting certain organizations; currents of "undesirable" critical opinion were driven underground, individuals censored their own thoughts, organizations purged their own ranks.

The collapse of the old Left in the postwar period meant that the liberals of the Democratic Party were subject to no pressure or competition except from conservative or right-wing sources (much the same state of affairs prevailed in the trade union movement). The official liberalism of the Democratic Party, which was really "the new conservatism," lived off the store of ideas that had been developed in the 1930s. It responded to new issues and new problems by offering "more of the same," that is, extending the programs of the New Deal.

More important, the collapse of the Left has deprived us all of a comprehensive critique of American society, its values, its direction, its performance. The New Deal was not based on any carefully thought-out assumptions; its programs were mostly improvisations. The continued failure of the liberal Democrats to provide a serious alternative to the "reformism" of the early progressive

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movement had the effect of minimizing ideological differences of all kinds, including those between Democrats and Republicans. Both parties professed the same values, the same purposes, essentially the same policies. Both parties have accepted the ideology of "free enterprise," joined in the "American celebration," and endorsed the objectives of an expansionist foreign policy. Both have pushed the new American imperium. No partisan challenge has been offered to the Administration's assertion of a right of unilateral military intervention wherever it feels that vital "interests" have been threatened.

The collapse of the Left is an essential key to explaining the rot because the absence of ideological differences has been the historic weakness of American politics. Not only has the American Left contributed to this weakness; the lack of a consistent ideological drive explains the feebleness of the Left itself. "The American Left," as Michael Davie points out, "has always been more eccentric than effective. In Europe, men have had to battle for the establishment of their basic rights, and have needed a theory of drastic social change to go to war with." But not here. As Tom Hayden, one of the leaders of the New Left observes: "How *do* you act as a revolutionary against a nation-state that celebrates your values while betraying their substance?" Even in the fiercest American struggles, everyone of major political importance has believed in the same basic things. "The mainstream of the American political tradition," to quote Davie again, "thus flows between firm banks (though it is not yet clear whether they can contain the Negro revolution) and features a steady belief in the sanctity of private property, the importance of economic individualism, and the unifying influence of greed. . . . Outside Portugal, Marx has had less influence in the United States than on any country in the Western world. . . . The most wretched victims of the American system [are kept] safely in the mainstream of the American political tradition—convinced that only luck or geography, never the system itself, stand between them and all-American prosperity." Al Capone once said to Claud Cockburn that "This American system of ours . . . gives to each and every one of us a great opportunity if we only seize it with both hands and make the most of it." Capone's view is still shared by most Americans. That it was never really true Indians and Negroes and others can testify, but it seemed to be true until fairly recent times. In the past, a debilitated American Left tried to mount a critique of the prevailing ideology, but the collapse of the Left in the postwar period silenced this type of criticism precisely when it was most needed.

The abdication of the Left in the postwar period, and the failure of the New Left thus far to fill the vacuum, have meant that the idea of a radical politics and the function it can serve in our kind of political system has been forgotten. Radical political pressures played a role in bringing the Republican Party into being. Radical political pressures also helped to shape the New Deal. Radical politics revivified the labor movement in the 1930s. Recently J. H. Plumb reviewed a collection of papers by American planners on environmental problems. In not one of these papers, he noted, had thought been given to the kind of politics that would be needed if any of the plans were to win a fair hearing. What he said has direct relevance to the rot in the political system:

> Environment problems get too easily abstracted from social problems, and social problems from their historical roots.
>
> How can planning work in a society which has sharp social divisions due to disparity in wealth as well as differences in color? How can planning work in a society in which profit, personal or corporate, must be a more urgent motive than control or conservation?
>
> So long as society is structured as it is there will be slums. . . . No amount of thinking about environment, no amount of planning the optimum space and minimal communal facilities can be effective without political action, and that means political action of a radical nature.
>
> The history of the last hundred years shouts that fact aloud. Human beings are like carrion crows, not Christians. They will not give up what they have to the poor, they have to be scared before they will disgorge.

A radical politics, whether organized as a party or as a movement, is needed today—as it has always been needed—to goad the two major parties, to offer a general critique of the society, and to give *political* expression to the discontents that can gain a hearing in neither major party. The New Left may meet this need; it has not done so to date.

A secondary but relevant explanation of the rot is that the major parties are hopelessly old-fashioned. On essential matters they have changed little in the last century. At the *national* level they are loosely organized. They spend a pittance on research and planning, and even less on education. They rally briefly during national elections but for the rest of the time are "demobilized" and lethargic. This slackness of organization mirrors the attitude of most voters, who are content to limit their political enterprise to the ritual act of voting every two years—when they bother to vote. The professionals who run the parties do not encourage any greater activity. The parties engage the active support of perhaps not more than 3 to 5 per cent of the membership. There was a time when various organizations and interest groups participated directly in political decision-making, but this pluralistic pattern has almost vanished, and today most of the interest groups are long since "integrated" into the power structure, i.e., they are more dependent on the party in power than it is on them. The New Left groups, therefore, quite properly attempt to build new bases of local power which may eventually acquire enough votes or enough "disruptive" power to engage the major parties and particular state and local administrations in meaningful bargaining. Even if this were to occur, however, national political decisions would still need to be made, national priorities established, and for that purpose well-organized national parties are indispensable.

At the national level, both major parties are still loosely organized coalitions formed for the purpose of conducting campaigns. The Republican coalition, established at the time of the Civil War, was ascendant until the successful New Deal coalition was put together in 1932. Since then, the Republicans have been unable or unwilling to form a new coalition and the New Deal coalition is now disintegrating. At the moment it would be difficult to say

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which party is the more sharply divided internally. Neither seems able to confront the new issues (too risky) or appeal to the new constituencies which have emerged since 1932 (to do so, just now, would endanger what is left of the old coalition). Yet recent polls show that a large—perhaps a third or more—and steadily increasing percentage of the electorate is dissatisfied with the candidates and programs and styles of both parties and therefore disinclined to participate actively in politics.

Instead of addressing themselves to the new issues and the new constituencies, both parties evade their responsibilities by resort to excessive "personality politics," TV-style (with the result that rising campaign costs threaten to make the Senate once more the "millionaire's club" that it was in the 1890s). The effect of all this is to encourage the feeling of "powerlessness" and enforce the conviction that political action is futile. It needs to be stressed that whereas at one time national coalition parties functioned reasonably well, today's problems are much more complex, the resistances to be overcome are much greater and the concentration of power is formidable. To make politics alive once more, national parties must be coherently and purposefully organized, and they must command enough energy, not merely to secure adoption of new programs but to make certain that they are properly administered. Neither party today is so qualified.

A related cause of the rot is the failure of the Republican Party to function as an opposition party. Since 1932 it has been obvious that the two-party system was endangered by the failure of the GOP to offer effective opposition by urging alternative programs and policies. It was generally assumed in 1952 that President Eisenhower would reorganize the party which had been, even then, much too long out of power. He had the prestige and the power, but he showed not the slightest interest in the problem, and a great opportunity was lost. The Goldwater explosion of 1964 was the logical consequence of failure to renovate the party and, judging by recent events, the need is still there.

The party system has been further weakened by a new situation. A combination of factors, with heavy emphasis on the mass media, has made a measure of "direct democracy" possible. Representative government is at best slow, cumbersome, exasperating. Nowadays many decisions must be made quickly if they are to be effective. Let's say that the mayor announces the immediate closing of a city hospital. There isn't time to distribute leaflets, interview officials, petition the parties, organize a campaign. So those opposing the closure chain themselves to the office furniture, after first giving the TV news rooms notice of time and place. A vast audience is immediately alerted, with little effort, at minimal expense.

In a sense, *the new media become a substitute for the party*. Often official reaction is swift and responsive; whereas when petitioners go through channels, elected officials can stall, appoint commissions, order investigations, etc. A pamphlet by John Morris on "Direct Democracy," published recently in London, explains the theory. The universal defect of representative democracy, so the argument goes, is the formation of controlling elites. Such government lets the people vote periodically for politicians or for parties, but seldom for policies. This, of course, merely echoes Michels' cynical comment: "The one right which the people reserve is the ridiculous privilege of choosing from time to time a new set of masters." Representative government was once a neccessity; people had to *send* representatives to the capital. But modern communications have made a degree of direct democracy possible and people are beginning to like it. Polls have somewhat replaced primaries as a means of registering voter preference. Experiments are being made to test the possibility of "instant" opinion polls by the use of computer techniques. Up to a point, there is much to be said for direct democracy and we shall see more of it; but it cannot substitute for partisan debate on significant issues, much less for representative government which extends and clarifies the partisan debate and, in the end, should resolve it. Direct democracy can stimulate and supplement representative government; it can never replace it.

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Given the extent of the rot that currently besets the American political system—and given the degree to which power is concentrated—it is not surprising that many people feel powerless, or that they have lost confidence in politics or are voicing doubts about representative government and liberal political institutions. Nor is it surprising that many young people have turned to "anti-movements" of one kind or another and taken to the streets to air their grievances and express their frustrations. What *is* surprising, given these factors, is the way in which "concerned" and "dissatisfied" citizens have tried to find new but democratic ways of expressing their judgments and preferences, with no aid and little encouragement from either party. It was not until the President began to escalate the war in 1965 that serious misgivings about it arose. Until then it had seemed merely another "police action" in furtherance of cold-war policies which had been pursued by both parties for twenty years without serious question or opposition. But once Mr. Johnson suggested the need for an increase in taxes, once it became clear that the war had been "Americanized," once the manpower requirements and the casualties began to increase, public dismay mounted rapidly. It took a quantum leap early in the summer. Between July and September, the percentage of the public supporting the war dropped 14 points; between September and October it declined a further 11 per cent.

Now, in part as a reaction to certain recent demonstrations, opinion seems to be shifting back a bit in support of the Administration. But during the last two years, there has been a sharp increase in concern and it has found expression through a variety of ingenious devices and forms *in spite of* the political rot. Most of these forms had to be improvised. Abhorrence of the war has found expression in advertisements, petitions, pamphlets, art exhibits, poetry readings, sit-ins, teach-ins, pray-ins, and all manner of protests and demonstrations. Criticism has been voiced in newspaper polls, and in informal referenda. Students have been polled; professional organizations have canvassed their members; faculties have done the same. In Cambridge, Mass., and San Francisco, the issue has been forced on the ballot with results that under the cir-

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cumstances have been truly impressive. What this rising protest lacked, until recently, was any semblance of national political leadership; and what it still lacks, in general, is a sustained political emphasis. In a way, it represents a kind of "anti-politics" since neither political party has, to date, seen fit to respond to it.

All the same, the prospects for a reversal of policy, for a redirection of American power, are not nearly as bleak as they have been pictured. An enormous volatility, as yet unexpressed, just might ignite in 1968. In any case, it would be a sad mistake to write off the political prospects as unrealistic and improvise a kind of guerrilla "anti-politics" until an attempt was made to overcome the rot in the political system and to infuse it with an energy equivalent to what now finds expression in demonstrations and protests, many of which lack direct political relevance. It may be impossible, in the end, to cope with the concentration of power that exists today by normal political processes, but we shall never know until we give the system a chance to function. It is not a question of either/or but of both, a great deal more of both. Action protests can be combined with radical politics; action protests can also be combined with conventional politics. But action protests without politics will not stop the war, much less reverse the direction of American policy, much less open the structural changes needed by American society. The task of those who are concerned with these objectives, then, is to concentrate, for a change, on the political problems.

THE ADVANCEMENT SCHOOL

NORTH CAROLINA KILLS ITS DREAM

DAVID COOPER
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A year ago, the North Carolina Advancement School in Winston-Salem bustled with activity as talented young educators worked with eager eighth-grade public school students from all sections of North Carolina in an effort to find new ways of motivating "underachievers." Begun by former Gov. Terry Sanford in 1964, the Advancement School received national praise and was regarded as one of the most exciting educational experiments in America. *The New York Times, Time, The Christian Science Monitor* and the *Saturday Review* carried glowing stories; C.B.S. and N.B.C. sent camera teams to the school and reported its work over national television.

More important, the innovations used by the school's instructors appeared to work. Youngsters who seemed destined to become dropouts got "turned on" and became excited about their studies. The principals of the schools from which the 2,400 boys were drawn reported that 75 per cent improved their grades when they returned to their home classrooms, and that 90 per cent showed "markedly improved attitudes" about schools and studies.

But despite the country-wide excitement it created, despite its apparent successes, the future of the Advancement School is shaky. It stood vacant last fall, without students, classes or instructors. During last spring and summer, it had been crippled, if not killed, by some state and local politicians. Most observers and all of North Carolina's major daily newspapers blamed a state-level educational bureaucracy that at best showed no interest in the school, and at worst was intent on throttling innovations in education that might point to inadequacies in its own work. The North Carolina state government, under Sanford's successor, Gov. Dan Moore, planned to continue the school. Its new director has just reopened the project with a totally new staff and about 100 students. Few of those familiar with the school think it can generate again the excitement it once had or be a vigorous prober for new ideas.

The story of the Advancement School's decline is one of political intrigue. It could also be a harbinger of what lies ahead for the other educational innovations that abound in the country. One of the chief functions of the many new approaches is to search for new ways of teaching, new structures in education, new materials and new ideas. The whole thrust of such programs implies a criticism of existing educational institutions. How receptive, then, will the present authorities be toward an agency whose very role may involve criticism of the establishment? North Carolina's experience with the Advancement School may provide some answers.

Sanford ran in 1960 almost solely on a program pledged to improving North Carolina's public education. He conceived the Advancement School in 1963 toward the end of his term as Governor. Sanford, the youngest governor the state had ever had, brought a new excitement and energy to the office that impressed even his political foes. The main thrust of his educational improvement program was achieved in 1961, when he got the state legislature to impose new taxes to finance substantial increases for the school system. Most of the money went for teacher pay raises, but Sanford also launched a number of innovative programs, of which the Advancement School was one. "The mystery of the age is not the moon," Sanford wrote later in his book, *But What About the People?*; it is motivation." Reinforcing the Governor's general concern about "underachievers" was the fact that North Carolina had one of the highest school dropout rates in the nation. Thirty-five per cent of the state's fifth graders could be expected not to complete high school.

Armed with an $80,000 grant from the U.S. Office of Education, Sanford and his associates in the Governor's office began planning ways to meet the problem. Sanford brought in Harold Howe III, now U.S. Commissioner of

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Advancement in Philadelphia

Next week, *The Nation* will carry an article by Farnum Gray describing the experiences of the Advancement School, under its director, Peter Buttenwieser, in the urban ghetto conditions of Philadelphia.

Education, to help with the planning. Officials of the state educational establishment took part in the sessions.

Weeks of discussions and conferences produced the idea of a residence school for selected public school students at which various new ways of motivating pupils could be tried. To head the school, Howe brought Dr. Gordon L. McAndrew from California, where he was in charge of an Oakland city project designed to upgrade educational opportunities for 3,500 slum children.

Sanford created the Learning Institute of North Carolina (LINC) with Howe as its director; it was to be a semi-public agency designed to investigate new ways of helping local school units experiment in education. The Advancement School was to be LINC's major project.

A combination of federal, state and foundation funds was used to finance the school. The Carnegie Foundation put up $500,000; the state and federal governments each put in about $1.5 million for the school's first three years of operations. Since the state legislature was not in session, Sanford secured the state funds through budget transfers which later angered some lawmakers.

The state government finances all public schools in North Carolina. Policy for the schools is set by a State Board of Education, appointed by the governor, and an elected Superintendent of Public Instruction exercises much of the authority for overseeing operations.

To help the Advancement School become the innovator and catalyst Sanford envisioned, the school was made independent of the state education bureaucracy. The decision was supported at the time by Dr. Charles F. Carroll, the superintendent, and Dallas Herring, chairman of the board of education. Both were, with Sanford, founders of LINC and members of its board of directors. State funds for the Advancement School were funneled through the budget of the board of education.

In his book, Sanford says that LINC and the Advancement School "were almost killed at birth" by the state auditor, Henry Bridges, also an elected state official. Bridges, Sanford said, felt state funds could not legally be used for the Advancement School, despite an attorney general's ruling that they could. "I wanted to blast away," Sanford said, but instead negotiations with Bridges finally persuaded the auditor to drop his objections. Bridges, a member of the state Democratic Party's "old guard," was to emerge later in a final controversial episode involving McAndrew and the school's funds.

Winston-Salem leased an abandoned hospital to the school for $1 a year; and it opened its doors in the fall of 1964. McAndrew had recruited a staff of young, imaginative instructors from Northern states. Students were recommended by their home-town principals and the school was totally desegregated.

Instructors were willing to try almost any kind of technique in an effort to motivate the students, who came for three-month periods. For example, and English teacher roped the legs of two of his students together to show his class the workings of conjunctions. Special visual aid materials were used. Students often went on field trips. For the first several years, many public schoolteachers were brought to the school as part of the experiment.

In January, 1965, Sanford went out of office, but the new Governor, Dan Moore, was generally committed to retaining Sanford's programs. The Advancement School's first troubles began when the 1965 legislature convened a month after Moore took office. Legislators, irked by Sanford's transfer of funds without their authorization, almost killed the school off then and there by failing to supply it with state funds for the 1965-67 budget period. Moore's aides urged legislators not to drop the school, and it finally gained at least temporary safety. Legislators, however, authorized the Governor and a state budget commission to abolish the school after another year's operations if they felt it was not successful.

When the year was up, both the board of education and the Governor urged that the school be continued and funds were allocated to run it until the 1967 legislature convened.

In the period between the 1965 and 1967 legislatures, however, behind-the-scenes maneuvers set the stage for the school's eventual downfall. Board of education chairman Herring, Superintendent Carroll, the Governor and the board of education were all committed to "freedom of choice" in school desegregation. Herring became furious with McAndrew when the Advancement School director, in a speech to local school officials, suggested that "freedom of choice" was often a dodge to perpetuate segregation.

Howe went to Washington as Commissioner of Education, where his school desegregation guidelines soon made his name anathema to most Southern politicians, including Herring and Carroll. McAndrew succeeded him as director of LINC, and the Advancement School directorship went to a youthful New Yorker, Peter Buttenwieser. The fact that Buttenwieser was on the board of directors of the legal defense fund for the NAACP did not endear the school to some political leaders.

When N.B.C. broadcast a story on the Advancement School one Sunday evening, the footage dealt extensively with a skit on a theme similar to *West Side Story*. The show was hardly over when McAndrew got a call from Herring, a casket manufacturer in Rose Hill, population 1,300. "My God, Gordon, what's going on up at that school?" said Herring.

And then there was the seaman. The school's business manager was T. J. Van Metre, a retired Navy admiral. In mid or late 1966, Van Metre ran to Herring with a tale of "rampant homosexuality" and other immoral conduct at the school. Herring reported to Governor Moore, who in turn dispatched William C. Friday, president of the Consolidated University of North Carolina, to investigate. Neither Friday nor a later team of school superintendents could confirm Van Metre's tattle. As an insider, however, he enjoyed wide credence.

Since the Advancement School was not itself a state agency, it had to depend on some agency of state officials

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to seek funds for it from the legislature. This had been done by the board of education. However, in September, 1966, the board announced that it had decided not to request funds to continue the school beyond July 1, 1967. Herring and Carroll gave no public reason for the decision. Despite repeated invitations, neither state official had ever visited the school. Carroll said that he did not know enough about the school to state whether it should or should not be continued.

When the legislature convened last February, funds for the school were not included in the budget proposals presented by Governor Moore for the board of education. However, in reply to questions, the Governor said he would favor continuing the school if the state board endorsed the idea. McAndrew and Buttenwieser wanted the school continued as an independent agency, if possible, but were willing to have it placed under the board of education if that would assure its survival. They did not want their venture to be under state Superintendent Carroll, whom they regarded as a foe of innovation in education.

Republicans had captured five of Winston-Salem's seven legislative seats in the 1966 elections, and the school's future quickly became a political issue. All the Republicans backed a bill to continue the school as an independent agency; the two Democrats supported a measure to place it under the board of education. Finally, in March, the board of education endorsed a rather nebulous program calling for an expanded attack on underachievement with Carroll in charge. Herring implied that the Advancement School under McAndrew and Buttenwieser had not followed the school's original mandate to find the "causes of underachievement." The two youthful educators made it clear they were more interested in doing something about a problem known to exist than in piling up research. Buttenwieser criticized the board's position. Herring replied publicly: "Peter Buttenwieser has an educational philosophy which most North Carolina educators don't share." He did not elaborate.

In the end, the legislature ignored the board's proposal and placed the school, with no expanded program, under the board of education. It appropriated $1 million to run the school from July 1, 1967, until July 1, 1969. This final legislative decision did not come until late last June. By that time, Buttenwieser and almost all the school staff had become weary of hanging on a limb. Buttenwieser and most of his colleagues accepted an offer from Philadelphia to establish a similar school there. Other staff members scattered to other jobs, some to a program for underachievers established by school officials in Charlotte, N.C.

In September, the board of education hired Dr. John N. Bridgman, director of elementary education in Wilmington, N.C., as the school's new director. Bridgman, a native of North Carolina, admitted having trouble hiring a staff and said that the school would run for the present on a limited basis. Its future role is unclear.

McAndrew and Buttenwieser were back in controversy in September, when state auditor Bridges released a report on a special audit of the school, which had been requested by the board of education. Bridges said he found that



The Keys of Learning

McAndrew and Buttenwieser spent a total of $4,100 in school petty cash funds through their personal bank accounts. Buttenwieser and McAndrew, approached by Bridges while he was making the audit, had offered to document their use of the funds to the auditor's satisfaction, but Bridges released the document without accepting their offer.

The LINC board of directors gave McAndrew a leave of absence and asked him and Buttenwieser to itemize their expenditures. Both men provided affidavits and other documentation. Later, the board reinstated McAndrew and cleared both men of any misuse of the funds.

Also last fall, the board of education secured an advisory opinion from the state attorney general's office to prevent LINC from distributing to the state's public schools materials developed at the Advancement School under an $85,000 grant from the Carnegie Corporation. The advisory opinion went so far as to declare that no person, firm or individual, other than the board of education or the superintendent of public instruction, could approach local schools about curriculum, material or experimentation. LINC finally obtained use of the materials after its board of directors, headed by Governor Moore, asked the board of education to release them. The Carnegie Corporation, disturbed by the affair, released an unusual statement from New York calling the Advancement School and LINC "among the most far-reaching and useful educational programs in America."

But Buttenwieser may have raised a bigger question last April in a lengthy address to a Winston-Salem civic club. "At issue," Buttenwieser said, "is whether significant innovation—with its implied criticism of current educational practices—can come from within the public school bureaucracy. The state board of education feels it can. We at the Advancement School feel it cannot."

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LOS ANGELES TIMES

MOST LIKELY TO SUCCEED

PHIL KERBY

Los Angeles

In mid-September, 1958, the *Los Angeles Times* sniffed disaster in the air. In a lead editorial, the paper warned: "Threatening liberty in California seems as irrational as denying the existence of the Sierra Madre. This is the appearance. Nevertheless, there is the threat."

Among other frights, the *Times* predicted that "the two-party system would collapse," if the disaster struck. Moreover, the editorial continued, "It is hard to believe that Republicans and Democrats . . . will let their liberty go by default. . . . An impatient observer might say, 'Let them enjoy their lapse. It will teach them to be vigilant next time. . . .' But we have shown there probably wouldn't be a next time for vigilance: that is, a next time soon enough for this generation to recapture its liberty. . . ."

This classic of its genre was whomped up by the *Times* in anticipation of William F. Knowland's defeat for governor of California by Edmund G. Brown. The *Times* in 1958 was that kind of newspaper, hard-boiled, myopically reactionary and self-serving, with opinion slopping over from the editorial page into the news columns. Above all, the *Times* was provincial. The immensely prosperous paper had a three-man Washington bureau and only one foreign correspondent. Since Harrison Gray Otis, the founding dinosaur of the *Times* dynasty, bought the paper in 1881, its achievements had been amply recognized. Despite occasional lapses into grace, it could be counted upon to appear on every list of most deplorable newspapers put together by any gathering of newspaper men indulging in this melancholy diversion. The *Times* employed talented men, but they already lacked the freedom that the paper predicted would disappear in the catastrophic wake of a Democratic administration in Sacramento.

During the next decade, liberty, the Sierra Madre and the paper all survived its apocalyptic vision. In 1960, when Otis Chandler, then 33, succeeded his father, publisher Norman Chandler, (who had succeeded his father, Harry Chandler, who had succeeded his father-in-law, Harrison Gray Otis), this accession to authority was not unexpected. Prophetic fellow workers in 1953 had tabbed him "the man most likely to succeed" when he began a tour of duty in the paper's various departments that is the customary routine for publishers' sons. But this switch of publishers proved to be the first and most significant change in the metamorphosis of the *Times*. Today, it turns up regularly on any list of the nation's ten best newspapers.

Before he became publisher, Otis Chandler gave little indication that he would depart from the sanctified tradition of the family. He started with the advantages of money and position. Stanford, where he was educated, and the Air Force, in which he served, are institutions not designed to subvert these values. In her acerbic, maternal way, Dorothy Chandler, his mother, once remarked to *Newsweek*: "I was very surprised when Otis came out of the Air Force and went to work." Others of the family were also astonished—and less pleasantly so, as time went on.

One morning in March, 1961, conservative readers were gratified to see in the *Times* the first of a series on the John Birch Society and Robert Welch. Their pleasure turned to surprise and their surprise to anger. The series was factual, informative and critical and after it had run its course, the *Times* excommunicated the society and its chief from proper, conservative ranks. This piece of subversion caused a division within the Chandlers. Mrs. Philip Chandler, a member of the Birch Society, found the editorial among the least agreeable political comments she had read that year. Philip Chandler, Otis' uncle, soon thereafter resigned as vice president of the Times Mirror Company to devote his attention to another family enterprise. He said his move had "no connection at all" with the series, but while he was not in substantial agreement with the society ("or I would be a member, which I am not"), he found that in general its members "are a group of fine people."

Critical mail poured in from Birch members and their adherents, and the *Times*'s steady circulation growth began to slow. The fuss soon abated, however, and the paper continued to amass readers—by a phenomenal 61 per cent during the week in the past seven years and 30 per cent on Sunday. Its daily circulation (856,621) is exceeded only by the tabloid New York *Daily News* (2,074,621), the combined editions of *The Wall Street Journal* (1,115,000) and *The New York Times* (963,130). On Sunday, the *Los Angeles Times*'s circulation (1,145,695) ranks third behind the *News* (3,099,658) and *The New York Times* (1,588,091). The *Los Angeles Times* had moved ahead of *The New York Times,* but the latter regained its position on the death of the *Herald Tribune*. In total advertising linage (108.9 million lines in 1966), the *Los Angeles Times* leads all other U.S. newspapers by a wide margin and has done so for a decade.

The paper is emerging as the West Coast counterpart of *The New York Times,* and it is not inconceivable that long before Otis Chandler is ready to retire it could become the chief competitor of *The New York Times* as a national newspaper. (It is an ironic possibility that the New York paper's abortive experiment with a West Coast edition was in part responsible for the transfusion of editorial zeal that has reinvigorated the *Los Angeles Times.)* That feat would be accomplished by three elements: money, will and ability. The cash is available (The Times Mirror Company grossed more than $255 million in 1966 from the paper and other publishing ventures, and its income was up again in 1967), the intent is plain, and the ability is suggested by the record.

No other newspaper in the country has so thoroughly

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parted from an undistinguished past. No other newspaper, not even the *Times* of New York, has a richer base from which to operate—the five coastal counties stretching 216 miles from Santa Barbara to San Diego. Half of California's 20 million population is concentrated in this strip, which the *Times* dominates journalistically. Los Angeles is 2,474 airline miles from New York, and the *Times* does not share the disability of dailies on the East Coast, where even Washington's powerful *Post* operates under the shadow of *The New York Times*.

The new publisher's first move was to raise the level of his paper's national and international coverage. The changes were extensive. In place of the three-man bureau, the *Times* now has fourteen Washington correspondents. Chandler supplanted the one lonely foreign correspondent with fourteen, and assigned a man to the United Nations in New York. He set up seven domestic news bureaus, staffed by nine correspondents, to supplement the wire services with specialized reporting. In addition, the *Times*, in conjunction with *The Washington Post*, founded the Times-Post News Service in 1962 as the only national rival in this field to *The New York Times*. The news service editor, stationed in Washington, selects fifty to seventy-five dispatches daily from the domestic and foreign news flow of the two papers, and sends this wide range of fact and analysis to 211 subscribers on every continent, including 135 in the United States and Canada. The Los Angeles Times Syndicate distributes columns and other features to 1,000 newspapers in forty countries.

If the *Times* is to become a national newspaper comparable to *The New York Times*, it must compete in the areas of national and international reporting, and the Los Angeles paper has lavished most of its attention to date in this direction. Both domestic and foreign services will be strengthened steadily; a bureau will be opened in Rome this year. The paper shares a general weakness of the American press in neglecting Canada. One Los Angeles editor offered the cliché: "Nothing ever happens up there."

Money (the *Times*'s editorial budget has more than doubled since 1960 and reached $9 million last year) can create a large newspaper, but money alone cannot guarantee quality. That requires talent, and the *Times* has lured to its pages some of the best in the newspaper—and magazine—field. Magazines have long used newspapers as a recruiting ground; the *Times* is conscientiously returning the favor, taking top people from *Time, Newsweek, The Saturday Evening Post* and other publications by matching, and sometimes exceeding, their salary scales. Other attractions are personal recognition through bylines, in contrast to the anonymous group journalism of the news weeklies, and greater freedom. "No member of the staff [now more than 400; *The New York Times* news staff numbers 842] has *carte blanche* at the *Times*," says editor Nick B. Williams, "but on the other hand, editors in this office don't think they automatically know more about the story than the man on the scene." News-magazine correspondents complain habitually of the strange mutations their reports undergo in the home office.

The *Times* has ranged far for talent. James Bellows, last editor of the New York *Herald Tribune*, was brought to Los Angeles as associate editor, and perhaps heir apparent to Williams. Robert J. Donovan, chief of the *Tribune*'s Washington bureau, switched to head of the *Times* bureau there. Three other *Tribune* correspondents accompanied him. Osgood Caruthers, formerly of *The New York Times*, is now the *Los Angeles Times* man in Bonn; and Richard Reston, James Reston's son, is the Moscow bureau chief. National news editor Edwin O. Guthman, a Pulitzer Prize winner, came to Los Angeles from Seattle. He had also been Robert F. Kennedy's press aide. Another Pulitzer Prize winner, Jack Nelson, left *The Atlanta Constitution* to join the *Times*. *The Denver Post* contributed a third Pulitzer winner, its cartoonist Paul Conrad. Joe Alex Morris, Jr., is now stationed in Beirut, and Stanley Meisler in Nairobi (both contribute to *The Nation*).

While the *Times* covers major news stories in detail, the paper devotes increasing attention to interpretation, and has no plans to compete with *The New York Times* as a journal of record. The Los Angeles editors feel, for example, that D. J. R. Bruckner's and Jack Nelson's interpretive reports from the Midwest and the South tell more about those regions than blow-by-blow descriptions of isolated events. The *Times*'s foreign correspondents similarly leave to the wire service most of the breaking news and concentrate on its significance. (They often draw a thin line between subjective personal opinion and professional evaluation, but objectivity has always been more myth than fact. Selection of the "facts" is itself a form of interpretation.)

The weakness of the paper, one critic complains, is its failure to come to grips with its own community; or, as another put it, "When is the *Times* going to establish a Los Angeles bureau?" Los Angeles, like all other great urban conglomerations, is afflicted with foul air, race conflicts, slums, traffic snarls and sleazy, unplanned growth. Except when a ghetto erupts, such problems have usually been neglected by most newspapers. It is easier and less hazardous for local editors to denounce Bobby Baker than to expose corruption in their own communities. For whatever reason, this has been partly true of the *Times*, but it is becoming less so. Last spring, the paper exposed connections between two municipal commissions and the real estate developers, and later documented conflicts of interest in another city board [see *The Nation*, June 12 and November 6, 1967]. As a result, the Los Angeles county grand jury on December 28 indicted City Human Relations Commissioner Keith Smith, Harbor Commissioner George D. Watson and former Harbor Commissioners Karl L. Rundberg and Robert N. Starr for bribery. In addition, Smith was charged with perjury and Watson with criminal conflict of interest. Also named in the bribery indictments was the late president of the Harbor Commission, Pietro Di Carlo, who drowned in the Los Angeles harbor November 7. The jury accused him of accepting two bribes from Smith. Police listed Di Carlo's death as an accident. While no newspaper can neglect its own doorstep and achieve overall distinction, the Frederick G. Bonfils rule no longer applies. Bonfils said in the twenties that a dog fight in Denver (he was involved in many) was more important to *Denver Post*

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readers than a war in Europe. The atom bomb did a lot to change that.

With the help of Gov. Ronald Reagan and the activist students—who are collaborating in a melodrama to stimulate public interest in the subject—the *Times* gives close attention to education. No other paper in the country reports this subject more consistently, more fully, or more ably. Under the proprietary watchfulness of Dorothy Chandler, the arts get broader and more critical coverage than ever before in the *Times*. The paper's astringent music critic, Martin Bernheimer, brought from the *Saturday Review,* is a new experience for Los Angeles. His predecessor distinguished himself principally as a foe of Stravinsky, who survived the tiny slings and arrows.

The transformation of the *Times* is nowhere more evident than in the editorial section, which used to consist chiefly of ringing harangues for the Republican Party. In contrast, and representative of the new approach, was a recent, brilliantly written essay on race relations. The *Times* asked: "Do we believe that our revolution, as Jefferson perceived and as Lincoln proclaimed, was a movement for the spiritual freedom of man, unbounded by geography, race or culture? Or do we believe that our revolution was for whites only?"

The paper reveals a growing sophistication toward its old bête noire, Reds in Hollywood. *West,* its new Sunday magazine, published a sympathetic where-are-they-now? piece on the "Hollywood Ten." A dead-pan put-on of film society, called "The Hollywood Establishment," recently enlivened *West*'s pages.

The *Times* still for the most part supports Republican candidates, although the days of its Pavlovian response to the 20th century are over. With a bow toward Otis the founder, the paper endorsed Barry Goldwater and later Ronald Reagan, but did so tepidly enough to risk its Republican franchise. Reagan and the *Times* are now living apart, and their incompatibility may reach a divorce court.

The *Times* restricts its own opinion to two columns running down one side of the editorial page, and opens seven columns daily and twenty-two on Sunday to interpretive articles by staff members, outside experts and a mixed bag of columns. These range from Walter Lippmann to William F. Buckley, Jr., with Joseph Kraft, Max Lerner, Joseph Alsop, Raymond Moley and a variety of others somewhere between. Drew Pearson is tossed in frequently to add roughage, except when he is tossed out as being a little too rough.

The paper, perhaps too self-conscious of its past, nibbles at its targets, but rarely bites. Teeth are supplied occasionally in the letters columns, where the best testimonials to the new *Times* come from its devout enemies. One fierce lady, feeling the conservative Pasadena ground reeling under her low-heel walkers, wrote: "The *Times* is now the Fabian mouthpiece of libertines, libidinous louts, and printers of pandering lies, determined to destroy the dignity and sense of decency which Americans, formerly, revered as indices of manhood, separated from bestiality." The *Times* might consider dipping its pen now and again in that lady's ink.

JAPAN IN ASIA'S FUTURE

W. MACMAHON BALL

Mr. Ball is on the political science faculty of the University of Melbourne. In 1946 and 1947, he was Australian Minister to Japan. He is the author of Nationalism and Communism in East Asia.

How is America's present policy in Vietnam likely to affect Japan's future policy toward America? How carefully have the makers of American policy considered this? What role do they hope or expect Japan to play in Asia's future?

It seems certain that Japan must in its own right be a leading power in East Asia. The Japanese are the most highly educated people in Asia, much better educated than many Western peoples. They are skilled in science and technology, organization and management. Unlike many Asian nations they are remarkably homogeneous in race, religion, language and culture. They have a sense of national unity that somehow transcends the endless din of personal, factional and party conflicts.

Japan's economic recovery and growth over the past fifteen years is one of the most impressive achievements in the world's economic history. Japan has now surpassed France, West Germany and Britain in the production of steel and of motor vehicles. In 1967 its shipbuilding led the world for the twelfth successive year. All this has given the Japanese Government and people a confidence that their country can play a key role in the future of Asia. The big question, of course, is whether the role they want to play is the one the United States wants them to play.

There is lately a marked contrast between Japan's readiness to make bold international economic commitments and its reluctance to make political or military commitments. On the economic front Japan has joined the Organization for European Cooperation and Development (OCED), and agreed, as a member of the Development Assistance Committee, to lift its foreign aid to 1 per cent of its gross national product. The government has convened in Tokyo conferences of those in charge of economic affairs in Southeast Asian countries. It has shown initiative in searching for ways to restore Indonesia's economy. It has matched the American contribution of $200 million to the Asian Development Bank, has promised $100 million to its special agricultural fund.

But on the political and military fronts the story is different. Prime Minister Eisaku Sato has expressed his government's sympathy with U.S. objectives in Vietnam. He has said that it would be unreasonable to expect

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America to suspend the bombing of North Vietnam without some "reciprocal assurance" from Hanoi. Yet it might be misleading to take Mr. Sato's soothing statements as a sure indication of Japan's future foreign policy. They are an understandable response to present American and domestic pressures. There has been a strong and growing domestic demand that America should return to Japan the civilian administration of Okinawa. Perhaps Mr. Sato felt that his chance of getting this major concession from Washington would be enhanced if he expressed his general sympathy with America's cause in Vietnam. He was too hopeful.

It is also understandable that Americans in high places may be impatient with Japan's evident reluctance to give economic aid, and adamant opposition to giving any military aid, to the government of South Vietnam. In American eyes Japan is trying to have its cake and eat it. The Japanese Government is content to shelter under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but not willing to spend even 1.5 per cent of its gross national product on defense. Meanwhile, the Japanese find that providing many of America's needs in Vietnam is a highly profitable business.

It is not certain that Mr. Sato has full authority to declare Japan's foreign policy. This is said not because his Liberal Democratic Party suffered a marked setback at the general election last January, for the Socialist opposition also lost votes. It is because many factions of his own ruling party, as well as the great majority of the parties in opposition, are so deeply opposed to any active support for the military containment of China. Indeed Mr. Sato has sometimes seemed to be at odds with Mr. Miki, his Foreign Minister, who has publicly described the Vietnamese War as "a civil war," and insisted that its basic cause is the failure of successive governments of South Vietnam to take constructive measures to relieve the poverty of the people. Mr. Rusk hardly shares this view. The Japanese Government's attitude toward the Asian Pacific Conference (ASPAC) illustrates its general approach to what Mr. Miki calls the "Asia-Pacific Sphere." When the original sponsors of ASPAC asked Japan to join, since its presence would clearly give the new organization a prestige it would otherwise lack, Japan made it a condition of joining that ASPAC must be concerned only with cooperative efforts to stimulate economic development in East Asia, and be in no sense an anti-Communist or anti-Peking alliance. Only after these conditions were satisfied did Japan take part in the first conference in June, 1966. It is reliably reported that at the second conference last year the Japanese delegation declined to sign the draft communiqué until direct warnings about communism and indirect warnings about China had been deleted.

It is hard to get a clear picture of the role Japan wants for itself in East Asia from what the party leaders say, for what they say tends to change, at least in emphasis and tone, with every shift in the balance of factional power within these parties. Despite the difficulties, I think it possible to generalize about how most Japanese feel and think on certain basic issues. I believe it impossible for any Japanese Government to carry out a foreign policy that contravenes these feelings and thoughts.

The Japanese feel increasing concern about China's ambitions. For some years the split between Chinese and Russian Communists has created a series of dilemmas for the Japanese Communist Party, which is trying to be neutral but is now much closer to the Russians than to the Chinese. Many Japanese Socialists, notably the more idealistic among them, have been dismayed by the Chinese nuclear explosions, and by the turmoil of the cultural revolution. Yet I believe it would be a profound mistake for the West to jump to the conclusion that the anxieties of the Japanese will bring their view of China into focus with the American official view. The Japanese

evaluation is that, however unlimited China's declared ambitions may be, its real ambitions are limited, and can be accommodated without any real or present danger to Japan's national interests.

The human sympathies of the Japanese are not with the Americans but with those Vietnamese who are targets of American firepower. The British sociologist, R. P. Dore, has summed it up this way: "A good many Japanese . . . have seen the war as a battle between white men armed with big planes throwing big bombs at underdog Asians—and people with Mongolian features at that—who squat down to eat rice out of bowls with chopsticks, and might, but for the grace of God, be themselves." It is inconceivable that America can win the sympathetic support of the Japanese people for its military policy in Vietnam.

Sympathies for fellow Asians reinforce the alarm of the Japanese for their own safety. They fear that even a limited conventional war between America and China or America and the Soviet Union would almost certainly embroil Japan. Above all, they fear a nuclear war that might obliterate their nation.

The Japanese believe they understand the Chinese—and other Asians—better than Westerners can. They fundamentally disagree with the present American strategy toward China. The Japanese Government knows how much it has depended and continues to depend on the friendship of the United States, but it is tending to insist with increasing confidence that its economic, political and military policies must be formulated in Tokyo, not in Washington. It is nearly unthinkable that Japan will join other non-Communist Asian countries in a military alliance against China in particular or communism in general.

It would be foolish to pretend that Japan's attitude

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toward its own military security is clear-cut and consistent. Ever since the peace treaty, and the defense treaty with America in 1957, which was amended and extended for ten years in 1960, Japanese leaders have had great difficulty in explaining why they have self-defense forces, and since they do have them, why they spend a decreasing percentage of gross national product in maintaining them. It seems that Japanese Governments have made an important distinction beween the safety of Japan and the containment of communism. On balance they are reassured by the kind of treaty that brings Japan within the shelter of the American nuclear deterrent. But it is quite another thing to have the sort of security treaty that may involve Japan, against its own judgment, in an American-led war against communism. Japan would not welcome any extension of communism in Asia, but it believes that Western military intervention to contain China involves unacceptable costs and risks, and is in any case unlikely to succeed. When the renewal of the security treaty with America was being debated with such excitement in 1960, the most important single issue was whether America was to have the right to operate from its bases in Japan without the consent of the Japanese Government. The American Government was ready to agree to use the bases for operations in the Far East only "after consultation with" the Japanese Government, but would not agree to use them only "with the consent of" the Japanese Government.

Can Japan expect to enjoy the protection of the American nuclear deterrent without the obligation to give moral, material and perhaps military support to America's objectives in East Asia? That is what the Japanese want to be able to do. They argue that Japanese economic and technical aid to the non-Communist countries of Southeast Asia can do more than military intervention to help these countries maintain their independence. This is the sort of argument that cannot be proved right or wrong in advance. The important thing is that it expresses a consensus of Japanese feeling.

In the last few years the Japanese leaders have gained the confidence to make it clear, however politely, that they want to make their own assessments of what is happening in Asia, and to decide for themselves the role they want to play. It is a leading role, but not a military one. That is not because the Japanese leaders are pacifists; it is because they do not see the present dangers in Asia as threats of military aggression, and therefore feel they cannot be effectively met by military measures.

I think that Japan's leaders believe that peace between Asia and the West is Japan's first national interest. I think the West would be wise to respect Japan's judgment about how Japan can best help achieve this objective.

LETTERS *(Continued from page 66)*

independent, democratic, European fortnightly of high literary and artistic value that raised its voice, among other things, against totalitarianism, against racial discrimination, in Little Rock or in Kiev and for writers and intellectuals thrown into jail in South Africa or in Hungary, in Spain or in the Soviet Union. . . . Perhaps the time has come to set the record straight, at least as far as the relationship between Hungarian *émigré* intellectuals and the Congress for Cultural Freedom is concerned. . . . it must be said, it seems to me, quite emphatically, that the CCF performed an important and successful human, moral and organizational function in regard to a very large number of Hungarian intellectuals, students, artists, musicians and writers when it was most needed, namely, during the first and frightening yet unforgettable years of their exile.

Tamaás Aczél

North Dakota resolves

Berkeley, Calif.

DEAR SIRS: From the endless oyster bed which back issues of the *Congressional Record* seems to be, I found another pearl the other night. I think it well worth consideration by the assorted skinny-dippers who fret about the "rigid extremism" of wording like that of San Francisco's Proposition "P" regarding Vietnam (which managed a sizable roll-up despite almost 100 per cent opposition by the press).

Here is the pearl:

Resolution of the Legislature of North Dakota to the Committee on Foreign Relations—Senate Resolution 1 (1951), Cong. Record, p. 908, 1951.

Be it resolved by the Senate of the State of North Dakota, that the Congress and the President of the United States are respectfully urged to take immediate action for the following purposes:

1. To withdraw all troops and military personnel from Korea;
2. To recognize the principle that no political or military commitment with respect to foreign policy that may involve the lives of Americans is binding upon the people of the United States unless it is first approved by the Congress; . . .
5. To provide the people of the United States with realistic information so that public opinion may crystalize in the form of a unified and unselfish foreign policy that history will applaud, and
6. To disassociate ourselves from the Korean policy which has brought to our youth the tragedies of war without a candid recognition of the existence of a state of war, a policy which has made us the policemen of the United Nations without the United Nations assuming full responsibility for the eventualities of police action, a policy which risks war without first determining whether the objectives sought are worth the risk, or a willingness to accept the risk when encountered;

That a copy of this resolution be signed by the President and Secretary of the State Senate and sent to the President of the United States, Secretary of State and to each Congressman and Senator from North Dakota.

Ray Schnell, Pres. of Senate
W. J. Trout, Sec'y Senate 1951

I submit that the Senate of North Dakota has not of recent decades been noted for outlandish left-wing behavior—nor even in the forgotten past of 1951 was it a hotbed of radical irresponsibility. . . . *Helen Hosmer*

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BOOKS & THE ARTS

Communist Dreams and Soviet Reality

THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: Russia 1917-1967. *By Isaac Deutscher. Oxford University Press. 115 pp. $3.75.*

DAVID JORAVSKY
Mr. Joravsky teaches history at Northwestern University. He is the author of Soviet Marxism and Natural Science *(Columbia University Press).*

This is the first of two issues on some of the many books published in connection with the fiftieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. Next week's issue will contain reviews by Donald Fanger on Bulgakov, Simon Karlinsky on Pasternak, Mark R. Hillegas on Zamyatin and Katayev, and Helen Yglesias on works by Ehrenburg, Semyonovna Ginzburg and Chukovskaya.

Despair occasionally threatened Isaac Deutscher's dream of revolutionary salvation. The Russo-Chinese conflict provoked an especially poisonous reflection: "Arrogant bureaucratic oligarchies, incorrigible in their national narrow-mindedness and egoism, cannot be expected to work out any rational solution of this or any other conflict; still less lay stable foundations for a socialist commonwealth of nations." (*The Unfinished Revolution,* p. 108). Yet Deutscher kept his faith in the proletarian internationalism that would save the world from war.

Similarly with the other dreams that inspired the October Revolution. Deutscher virtually ruled out the possibility that any of them will be brought to life by the Communist governments: not direct democracy, and certainly not the withering away of the state; not workers and peasants running their own factories and farms, and certainly not the free distribution of goods according to each man's notion of his own needs; not the true marriage of intellectual and folk culture, and certainly not the fusion of manual, mental and managerial functions in superbly versatile new men. Yet Deutscher continued to cherish these Marxist dreams, insisting that somehow or other a revolutionary transformation will make them real.

Because of this faith he could neither remain a Communist (he quit in 1932), nor join "the enemy camp," nor sink into quiet skepticism. He maintained his faith by working at history, the literary art that may not neglect the known facts. That is not unusual. Many people keep a variety of faiths by working at history, but they usually huddle together in schools, acquiring thus a captive audience, a guaranteed income, and constant reassurance from one another's endless demonstrations that the grand old faith is supported by the known facts, which only seem to be chaotic and subversive. Deutscher was unusual in being a free lance, not only financially but intellectually. Indeed I am forced to call him unique. I cannot think of one other recent student of the Russian Revolution who has worked on the assumption that the original Communist dreams have been in process of realization.

Soviet historians long ago changed the dreams to suit current political needs, and for the most part their art has shocked readers into disbelief by deliberately ignoring known facts. Communists outside the Soviet Union have shrunk from a detailed study of their favorite revolution, or they have written in the Soviet style, redefining the original dreams to the point of disappearance and blandly ignoring inconvenient facts. (See, most notably, the histories of Andrew Rothstein and Louis Aragon.) Most non-Communist writers have nourished their faiths by polemics, endless demonstrations that the Bolsheviks were power-mad demagogues who never believed the dreams they preached, or fanatics who quickly turned into demagogues. None of these schools took kindly to Isaac Deutscher. For the most part they ignored him.

Some non-Communists resemble the 16th-century *politiques,* who helped end the wars of religion by extricating themselves from religious faith. For the *politiques* the truth or falsity of religious beliefs mattered very little; the important thing was to get rival believers to live in peace. Humane skeptics of this type have been Isaac Deutscher's most sympathetic audience. They read him as they read Graham Greene, an author who turns a fearfully odd creed into something understandable, not frightening, even quaintly appealing. In short, Deutscher's books have not provoked thought as much as they have stirred sentiments, hostile among cold warriors, friendly among neutrals, and condescending among sophisticates, who think of Deutscher as the last surviving specimen of an extinct species.

Any condescension that may be appropriate here should not be directed at Deutscher. His books do contain powerful stimulus for thought, but they have been kept from the audience that would respond. In Communist countries his biography of Stalin and his three-volume monument to Trotsky would provoke furious argument about the contrast between Communist dreams and Communist reality. So they are banned. Deutscher consoled himself with the conviction that some day the revolution would be revitalized, and that his books would then find their proper audience. He never seriously considered the possibility that Soviet Communists might share with Spanish Catholics or American nationalists a permanent aversion to critical self-examination. Of course he recognized the abundant evidence of such an aversion up to now; he was an honest scholar. But he systematically ascribed it to the "arrogant bureaucratic oligarchy," a transient product of historical circumstances, not to communism as such.

Deutscher had a very simple method for absorbing subversive facts without overturning his faith. He blamed them on the Russian past or on the world situation or on some other circumstances extraneous to communism. Whatever he admired he credited to the ideals of Marxism, or the heroic qualities of the proletariat or some other essential element of communism. He resembled the better Christian scholars, who do not shrink from telling the most repulsive facts of their church's history because they distinguish between the church militant, which is of this world and shares its imperfections, and the church triumphant, which is perfect, as we shall all see if we live long enough. Malraux made this analogy at the time of the blood purge, and Deutscher quotes him with obvious sympathy: "'Just as the Inquisition did not detract from the fundamental dignity of Christianity, so the Moscow trials do not detract from the fundamental dignity of Communism.'" (*The Prophet Outcast,* p. 370.)

A smile or a groan will not deliver the sophisticate from metaphysical distinctions of this type. He cannot speak of communism—whether ideology, movement, government or all three—without defining it. Even if his definition runs to several volumes of historical discourse he is bound to distinguish between the

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persistent or essential characteristics of his subject and its transient or accidental ones. Thus the distinction between the church triumphant and the church militant, between essential communism and its accidental features, appears in the typical non-Communist history as it does in Deutscher's, only reversed.

The typical non-Communist begins by emphasizing the authoritarian aspects of Marxist ideology and the tyrannical fury that Lenin displayed in pre-revolutionary factional quarrels. To this essential heritage he joins the accident of Russian collapse in the First World War, and returns to essentials: the armed seizure of power, the suppression of rival parties and of dissent within the Bolshevik Party, the triumph of Stalinism with its blood purges and concentration camps and, most of all, the frenzied building of an industrial-military complex. These are the essentials of communism to the typical non-Communist. All contrary evidence is brushed aside or explained away as sucker bait, or historical accident or—considering the changes since Stalin died—the incipient dissolution of communism.

It is as if a historian of Protestantism brushed aside the appeal to individual conscience, calling it demagogy or utopian nonsense, and declared the essential characteristic of Protestantism to be the subjection of individual consciences to absolute state churches or church states. In 1567 this would have been a plausible argument. Or in 1867, when another revolutionary outburst in France had led once again to Napoleonic monarchy, it would have been plausible to point and exclaim: There is the essential result of the democratic revolution, not the Jacobin republic, and certainly not Babeuf's society of equals.

It was Isaac Deutscher's great service to remind anyone who would listen that the military-industrial strength of the Russian or the Chinese state is not the only, or even the most important, indication of the essence of communism. He was sure that the dreams of subject people throwing off their oppressors, of workers running their own factories, while the state withered away and the nations rejoiced in friendly diversity, that these dreams would reassert their power, as the Protestant dream of free conscience continually reasserted itself from the Hussite Wars through the Puritan Revolution. (He makes this explicit comparison in *The Unfinished Revolution*, pp. 109-11, though he obscures it somewhat by Marxist clichés about the Reformation.)

Metaphysical faith is required for such a conviction, as it is for the opposed belief of the typical anti-Communist, who is willing to concede only this much hope for red regimes, that they may evolve into something like his own. The simple truth is that we don't know for sure who is moving toward what goal (if there is any goal), because we can't be sure (until the story is ended and no one is left to tell it) what has been essence and what accident.

Those who favor scientific history, rather than storytelling by and for the faithful, must recognize that their prospects are not very bright. Hardly any historians make a serious effort to observe the basic rule of scientific inquiry: to imagine what facts would disprove their pet beliefs, and to go look for such facts. At best the average historian worries about the inconvenient facts that infidels may use against him, and he looks for such facts in the writings of infidels. If the community of scholars is sufficiently large and sufficiently divided in its rival faiths, the resulting disputes may drive metaphysical beliefs toward precise definition and empirical test—or the scholars may be driven toward bewildered despair. The world community of scholars studying communism is very large, and it seems to be sufficiently divided in its rival faiths: varieties of communism versus varieties of anti-communism, with a few *politiques* hunting for neutral ground in between. The trouble is that nearly all of these scholars are agreed in one crucial aspect of their otherwise different faiths. They have an overwhelming tendency to assume that communism is what has prevailed in Communist movements and regimes during the past half century: totalitarian mobilization of backward nations for the murderous game of international politics.

Most scholars brush aside or explain away the fact that the Communist revolution began, as the democratic and the Protestant did, with "the dazzling blaze of a great vision" (*The Prophet Armed*, p. 318), promising perfect freedom and brotherhood. Deutscher spent his life reminding us of that fact, which is crucial to an understanding of 1917 in Russia, when all varieties of realistic politicians lost control of the lower classes. (Was this an accident or an essential foreshadowing of a century of total war?) Deutscher stressed the original dreams because he was sure that they are not utopian, that future Communists will revive them. We should amend his "will revive" to "may revive," and begin our studies with this insight.

Stories of a Soviet Writer

ENVY AND OTHER WORKS. *By Yuri Olesha. Translated, with an Introduction by Andrew R. MacAndrew. Doubleday-Anchor. 288 pp. $1.45 paper.*

LOVE AND OTHER STORIES. *By Yuri Olesha. Translated, with an Introduction by Robert Payne. Washington Square Press. 230 pp. $4.95.*

EDWARD J. BROWN

Mr. Brown is chairman of the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures at Indiana University. His most recent book is Stankevich and His Moscow Circle: 1830-1840 *(Stanford University Press).*

These two volumes offer the hope that, after long neglect, a brilliantly original Soviet artist will not be without honor, at least among strangers. Olesha's reputation suffered grim vicissitudes in his own country. For twenty years he was practically forgotten, though he is now established among the intellectual elite as a writer whose works contain intimations of greatness. His career was a casualty of the brutal pressures engendered by dictatorship. He was a "Soviet writer" for thirty years, yet he wrote little; all his important prose can be encompassed in one single thin volume.

Olesha's novel *Envy* and his short stories present philosophical problems, psychological studies and social commentary, embodied in symbolic situations or childlike images. The story "Liompa" counterposes a tiny boy, whose impressions of the world have not yet been organized as concepts and given "names," and a dying old man, whose sense impressions, as they weaken and recede, seem to leave behind only the abstract husks of their "names." For the child, all sense impressions are vivid and exciting because they are new and uncategorized and each can be dealt with as itself, directly; for the dying man, sensual experience is the very life that is leaving him. A somewhat older boy symbolizes what the tiny one will become: he is building a model airplane and he uses measurements, charts and tables. The story pronounces no judgment, it "prefers" neither the cerebral nor the sensual; it simply develops in the death of old Ponomarev and the eager life of his young visitor ("Grandpa! Your coffin's just come!"), a brief symbolic statement on the growth and decline of the conscious life.

In the story "Love," the hero Shuvalov is puzzled by the problem of knowledge.

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"Do your senses convey a correct picture of the world to you?" he asks a color-blind friend, and receives the confident answer: "The whole world except for certain color details." But because Shuvalov is in love he attends precisely to the "color details," ignoring the categories established by form and line. The force of love even suspends the law of gravity, and in a dream Isaac Newton calls him to account for this.

"The Cherry Stone" is about the familiar anguish of unrequited love, and it mingles epistemology with social concern. The young man is an inhabitant of the "country of Attention and Imagination," where the mind creates a new world of experience out of the simplest reality, just by paying attention to it; he knows the lilac color and bony texture of stones, and how soft and elongated shadows are in the last moments of an afternoon.

The novel *Envy* was an immediate success when it appeared in 1927. Even the party critics were delighted at the spectacle of Kavalerov, a character who is a derelict poet, a defender of the past and an individualist, consumed with impotent envy of the new Socialist man. But Olesha's symbolism was more richly tiered than they at first realized. Kavalerov speaks for all those who find themselves at odds with the brave new world of organizations and organization men, and the novel's social message is deliberately ambivalent. Its form and its devices are boldly original. Sexual symbolism of a clearly "Freudian" provenance is central to its method. The relationship of Kavalerov to the commissar who has rescued him from an urban gutter is a confused homosexual attachment, an experience of both hatred and intense love. In order to lend depth to his central characters Olesha employs a variety of narrative devices: dreams, formal reports and interviews, a fairy tale, inner monologues, letters and memoranda, reminiscences. The prose is sensitive and rich with imagery. It offers the translator both opportunity and danger.

Mr. MacAndrew's volume is clearly the better of the two books under review. In addition to *Envy* and the important short stories, it includes Olesha's play *A List of Assets*, and his speech at the First Congress of Soviet Writers in 1934, a document of compelling historical and cultural interest. Lapses from accuracy are few and minor; yet MacAndrew often fails to convey an adequate sense of style. The subtle poetry in Olesha's prose can be lost easily unless special pains are taken to reproduce it in translation. MacAndrew occasionally omits phrases or simplifies passages. Perhaps an editor tampered with his work and, in "normalizing" his English, suppressed Olesha's cadences. But the translator does

BLACK MAN IN WHITE AMERICA

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nevertheless provide a generally accurate account of what Olesha said.

No such statement can be made of the second volume. *Love and Other Stories* contains a translation of *Envy* which, as Mr. Payne points out, is not his work. It was published thirty years ago at a time when relative ignorance of Russian was widespread, if not excusable, among translators. Linguistic gaucherie is revealed in the first sentence: "In the bathroom in the morning he sings out aloud." When Kavalerov describes with acerbic irony the great man's groin and its remarkable pubic adornment, our translator speaks of the "lower part of his stomach," indeed of his "adorable tummy." Something far worse than prudery is in evidence here.

Inaccuracies abound, and they mutilate the novel. When Babichev's rebellious brother, Ivan, is interrogated by the GPU, the following dialogue occurs: "You called yourself a king?" "Yes, a king of vulgarians." Here the translator destroys both sense and character when Ivan, a grotesque original in speech, thought and manner, is made to call himself "the king of platitudes." Olesha delights in visual images that shatter the optical stereotypes: sunlight reflected in a brass bowl, or broken into its full spectrum of color by a mother-of-pearl button. Sight for him is a source of wonder and delight. At sunset a bearded gypsy in a blue vest carries a bright brass bowl on his shoulder. The day moves away on the gypsy's shoulder. What remains of this optical surprise in a translation which says, flatly: "The day was receding behind the gypsy's shoulder"?

Payne's own versions of Olesha are superior to the translation of *Envy* which he saw fit to include. Yet he too is capable of distorting both meaning and image. When the lovelorn young man in "The Cherry Stone" hides his cherry pit, his "seed," in the ground in memory of his love, Payne has it that he is "hiding a family in the ground." In the same story he mistranslates 3:15 o'clock as 4:20, and thereby spoils the point of a scene and ruins a metaphor. One shudders at the many possibilities offered in these translations to symbol hunters and close readers who will have no way of knowing what Olesha wrote.

Many more examples of this sort could be given. The Russian Library edited by Payne, to which this volume belongs, is making available some excellent works, among them Osip Mandelshtam's poetry, Gogol's "Correspondence with Friends," the complete plays of Vladimir Mayakovsky. Such an impressive list ought certainly to add prestige to both editor and publisher. One hopes that the translations will be adequate.

In the Beginning There Was Art

JOHN BERGER

Mr. Berger writes regularly on art for New Society *(London). His most recent published work is* A Fortunate Man *(Holt, Rinehart & Winston). This article and an earlier one, "Neizvestny & the New Art"* (The Nation, *November 21, 1966) will form part of a work to be published this year by Pantheon,* Art and Revolution: An Essay on Neizvestny and The Role of the Artist in the U.S.S.R.

Why, for a few years before and after 1917, was there a movement in the Russian visual arts which, for its creativity, confidence, engagement in life and synthesizing power has so far remained unique in the history of modern art? Why do certain works and ideas, created in Russia between 1917 and 1923, still seem to refer to the future now?

Up to 1917, Russia was still politically an absolutist state without democratic liberties. It was still awaiting the transformations which in the other industrialized countries had been brought about by bourgeois revolutions. Yet the Russian bourgeoisie as a whole remained timid, unrevolutionary, and only mildly reformist in respect of the autocracy. (The fact that a few unusually intelligent individuals patronized the arts on such a scale, and in such a remarkably far-sighted way, may be connected with the weakness and lack of vision of the bourgeoisie as a whole; had they been members of a class in which they could believe as a force, they might well have directed their vision and energy into political and financial organization.)

At the same time the Russian proletariat, formed in the relatively few (compared to Western Europe) but very large-scale factories and industrial centers, was quickly becoming one of the most militant and revolutionary in Europe. The revolution of 1905 suggested that the revolutionary force of the workers was overtaking and outbidding that of the bourgeoisie *before* the latter had established the necessary conditions for their own proper economic development. Twelve years later, the two revolutions of 1917 proved that this was indeed the case.

At this period Russian artists, as members of the Russian intelligentsia, were, by definition, concerned with the political and spiritual future of their country. The most farseeing envisaged this future as Socialist. They recognized that the autocracy had to be destroyed and none wished to imitate in Russia the ruthless and soulless capitalism of the West. They disagreed about means and particular aims. Some placed their faith in the character of the Russian peasant, others in industrialization, some in permanent revolution, a few in unorthodox religion, but all of them were aware of the strange dynamic of the Russian situation: their backwardness had become the very condition of their seizing a future, far in advance of the rest of Europe. They could transcend the European present, the present of the dehumanized bourgeoisie. Instead of present, they had past and future. Instead of compromises, they had extremes. Instead of limited possibilities, they had open prophecies.

Given this formulation, the interests of the visual artists were exactly as one might expect: an enthusiastic rediscovery of pre-European Russian art coupled with a search for the most advanced, the most modern means of expression.

(It might seem that there was a similar pattern of interest in the West: enthusiasm for the "primitive" accompanied by sophisticated innovation. But for the West the "primitive" belonged to foreign, exotic cultures and consequently there was little accompanying sense of continuity and destiny.)

The modern means of expression were supplied by cubism. I cannot here give a full study of the historical meaning of cubism: it must suffice to point out that cubism rejected the way of seeing, the approach to reality which originated in the Renaissance and had continued as the basis of art ever since. Cubism, in other words, marked in its own field the end of precisely that era—the era of capitalism, bourgeois individuality, utilitarianism—which Russia, it seemed, was about to transcend without ever having entered. And it marked it, not nostalgically but triumphantly by revealing new, more open and more complex possibilities.

Apollinaire wrote in 1914:

Où donc est tombée ma jeunesse
Tu vois que flambe l'avenir
Sache que je parle aujourd'hui
Pour annoncer au monde entier
Qu'enfin est né l'art de prédire.

In 1921 Malevich wrote: "Cubism and futurism were the revolutionary forms in art, foreshadowing the revolution in political and economic life of 1917."

It was the conjunction of the cubist example and the revolutionary possibilities in Russia which made the Russian art of this period unique.

One might argue that it was remark-

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able but not unique. From about 1905 onward, a sense of radical change was beginning to inspire *avant-garde* artists in other countries: the Futurists in Italy; the De Stijl group in Holland; Der Blaue Reiter in Germany; the Vorticists in England. But there was a significant difference of emphasis, largely due to the fact that for the Russian artists their own bourgeoisie was relatively unimportant *as an obstacle*. Hence there was no need either to shock the bourgeois or to accept his categories. The Russians exhibited none of the destructive frenzy of the Italian Futurists. (So-called Russian "Futurism" was informed by a quite different and far more rational and constructive spirit.) They seemed free from the tendency to moral absolutism which characterized the Dutch movement. And they were seldom introspective—in the same dark sense as the Germans: there was no retreat inward from the consequences of politics.

The works of Malevich, Lissitzky, Kandinsky, Tatlin, Pevsner, Rodchenko, differ a great deal from one another in spirit. At one extreme Tatlin denied the difference between art and any other productive activity; at the opposite extreme Kandinsky believed that art was valid only it it followed a mysterious and idealistic "inner necessity." Yet despite their differences, all had one attitude in common—and it is this which, at that period, can be defined as specifically Russian. All believed in the profound influence that art could have on individual and social development: all believed in the social role of art.

Yet their social consciousness was affirmative rather than critical. They saw themselves as already representing the liberated future. This liberation meant the breaking down of all divisions between classes, professions, disciplines and previous bureaucratic categories. Their works were like hinged doors, connecting activity with activity; art with engineering; music with painting; poetry with design; fine art with propaganda; photographs with typography; diagrams with action; the studio with the street.

Kandinsky was ideologically the most aloof of these artists, but this is how he wrote about his feelings when he was working in Germany in 1910:

"The corruptive separation of one art from another, and furthermore of 'art' from folk art and children's art from 'ethnography,' the firmly established walls between what I considered to be related or even identical manifestations, in a word, the synthetic relationships, gave me no peace. Today it may well appear strange that for a long time I could find no helpers, no means, simply not enough interest for this idea."

A great deal of what was produced or planned around the year 1917

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

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THE NATION invites you to sign a New Year's letter to Mr. McNamara:

You are not quit of history yet. No man is, who leaves high office in time of trial. What you do and say matters very much to this country. It can matter to the world, and to our future in the world.

For like it or not the United States today is at the center of a world-wide armed camp. You have been the chief engineer of that massive system of armaments. You have spoken often and suggestively of restraint in the use of that immense mobilized power, most directly in your last major speech in Canada.

When your new appointment to the World Bank was announced, we said of you:

"He should have resigned and stated his reasons."

We went on to say:

"That this is almost unthinkable is a commentary on the state of American politics. If McNamara could not override the taboo against resignation on grounds of principle, who can? Such resignations are vital from the standpoint of an informed, functioning democracy."

To this we now add, Mr. McNamara, that you took your oath of office to the American people, not to the present Administration.

We call on you to speak now about the policies that have launched this country into war in Vietnam, and which even now are breeding new agonies in future Vietnams.

The facts point inescapably to one conclusion: the United States has chosen a wrong road in Vietnam. It is a road that has led from what in the beginning was a highly questionable intervention, to what is now unquestionably a war of American aggression.

The war is now an American war, which Americans must end.

Eldon Kenworthy speaks to this point in our last week's issue:

"Americans continue to feel uneasy about withdrawal, even when their common sense increasingly tells them that Yankees can't hope to remake Asian societies. To put it bluntly, we have to make de-escalation and withdrawal respectable."

Mr. Kenworthy goes on to observe that even an "intermediate stage of enclaves, as in Galbraith's recent proposal," would help reverse policies which are now widening, not limiting, a tragically mistaken war. **It is the lack of positive action,** a lack decried by the Secretary-General of the U.N., by the Pope, and by the more informed segments of our own population, that has brought the peace movement to acts of rage and frustration. Do you truly not believe that this protest springs from unredressed grievance? We ask you to speak to this point.

Adlai Stevenson's life came to an end before he had a chance to speak out forthrightly on administration policies it had been his job to defend. He left us, as a result, a confused legacy.

Mr. McNamara, we ask you to answer this letter, and we have published it so others may join in the call. You know, as we know, that there are ways to reverse the policies that led to our armed invasion of South Vietnam. We want your views as you leave your post, and we believe no man of your honor would make a covenant to be silent.

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has been lost. Much of it was ephemeral.

Yet the paintings and constructions which did survive, the very notion of the artist-engineer, the polytechnic art training and research programs worked out by Kandinsky (first for Moscow and later for the Bauhaus in Germany), the startlingly new typography and format of books and posters, the combined use of poetry and visual images, the example of ideograms like Lissitzky's poster "Beat The Whites with the Red Wedge" as well as drawings of monuments which were never put up because of lack of resources, stage designs for the Meyerhold Theatre, the accounts of agitprop trains in which artists toured the country to explain graphically and verbally what was happening and what was necessary, entirely original experiments with exhibition techniques, the planning by artists of public celebrations such as the formalized re-enactment in October, 1918 of the revolution in front of the Winter Palace, the extremism of artists like Tatlin who, faced with the country's basic problems of survival, abandoned art to apply his visual experience and intelligence to the designing of stoves (maximum heat with minimum fuel), the energy that couples and uncouples Mayakovsky's poetry:

We will smash the old world
wildly
we will thunder
a new myth over the world.
We will trample the fence
of time beneath our feet.
We will make a musical scale
of the rainbow.
Roses and dreams
debased by poets
will unfold
in a new light
for the delight of our eyes
the eyes of big children.
We will invent new roses
roses of capitals with petals of squares

All this, seen as a threat by some and a liberation by others, served notice to the rest of Europe that the role of the artist in the coming world would be very different.

Some of the "leftist" theories can easily be criticized for their oversimplification. The artist-engineer is only one kind of artist: there are also artist-philosophers. The work of art and the machine product are not precisely the same. Yet their overestimation of the machine is understandable enough in the context; the idea of industrialization had acquired a lyrical power, for it seemed to offer a way of avoiding, instead of suffering and enduring, a whole phase of history. The same lyricism is in Lenin's slogan that communism is electrification plus the soviets.

More important than the exaggeration of the leftists was their prophetic vision. Cubism has destroyed the existing formal means in art: the categories within the canvas or sculpture. They proceeded to destroy the wider categories as between different media and as between the artist and the public for his art. No artists had ever lived and worked as they did. Their example rendered the Professional Painter and Sculptor (professional in the sense of belonging to one of the middle-class liberal professions) as obsolete as the *fin de siècle* bohemian or the *artiste maudit*. Mayakovsky wrote:

To work in a factory
blacken your face with smoke
then at leisure later
to flap bleary eyelids at
other men's luxuries—
what is the good of that?
Wipe the old out of our hearts!
Enough of penny truths!
The streets our brushes
the squares our palettes.
The thousand-paged book of time
says nothing about the days of revolution.
Futurists, dreamers, poets,
come out into the street.

Their vision has been criticized as being naively remote from the actual social reality. What can Tatlin's "Monument to the Third International" mean to a peasant with a wooden plough? The majority of the Soviet population were peasants at an extremely low cultural level. Yet what does the existence of the Third International—quite regardless of any monument—mean to such a peasant? There is often a tendency to expect the artist to solve, as if by magic, problems whose solutions depend upon there being more factories, schoolteachers, road makers, radio engineers. If Gabo's radio station had been built, Tatlin's monument would have made sense more quickly.

There is always a danger that the relative freedom of art can render it meaningless. Yet it is this same freedom which allows art, and art alone, to express and preserve the profoundest expectation of a period. It is part of the nature of man to expect more than he can immediately achieve. His expectations are never independent of necessity, but *the necessary should never be confused with the immediate*. Philip O'Connor writes, in his *Journal*: "Art deals only with what is, and by intensity extracts therefrom for the shaping of what will be, which is the essence of what should be—given perfect extraction."

Academicism has to be founded upon a hierarchy of established categories: it needs them for the application of its general and purely theoretical laws. It also needs them, administratively, for

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the working of its system of rewards and restraints. For a few years after 1917 the condition of Russian art was the very antithesis of that which had preceded it for nearly two centuries. "We have taken by storm the Bastille of the Academy," claimed the students. For a few years artists served the state on their own initiative in a context of maximum freedom. Soon a very similar academicism was to be reimposed.

THEATRE

HAROLD CLURMAN

"All the world's a stage." Perhaps it is because I have always regarded the world as "the wide and universal theatre" that I have so long been able to endure continual playgoing. Perhaps on this account, too, my idea of theatre has become so extended that I find the pleasantest evenings in occasions which are not usually included in that category. Thus the most agreeable moments of my recent visits to the playhouses have been at Roy Dotrice's one-man show of *Brief Lives* and at evenings of the Paul Taylor Dance Company. Unfortunately neither of these pleasures is any longer on Broadway (*Brief Lives* might have fared better in some less ostentatious locale), but I must not fail to speak of them, however briefly.

Roy Dotrice, an actor unfamiliar to me despite my many English journeys, has had extensive experience of both modern and "classic" roles: Edward IV, Caliban, Caesar and Hotspur. He is not a star, but a very fine actor. In *Brief Lives* he presents a "character" of 74; since a man of that age in the 17th century must have seemed preternaturally ancient, Dotrice, who is 42, is quite right in playing John Aubrey as if he were 100.

The action of the "play" takes place in lodgings in Dirty Lane, Bloomsbury, in 1697, the year of the old man's death. Born in 1624, Aubrey was a student at Oxford, and still a young man after the Civil War which restored Charles II to the throne of England. He spent most of his life collecting scholarly information and scandalous gossip, the best of which is contained in his *Lives*. Patrick Garland, credited as the author of the "play"—an arrangement of material from the *Lives*—tells us that Aubrey has only lately begun to be recognized as England's first serious biographer, one who can take his place alongside Pepys.

Brief Lives not only gives a glimpse of the ordinary mode of living during the Restoration, and of the times which preceded it—way back to Jacobean and Elizabethan days, about which Aubrey retails anecdotes which have come down to him from chronicles and older cronies—but communicates to the audience a sense of being an intimate witness of the related events and a close companion of the folk engaged in them. We see, touch and taste them!

The room, designed by Julia Oman, in which Dotrice-Aubrey shuffles about, cooking and eating his meals, cursing the squalling baby next door, yelling at coachmen on the street below, burrowing in his books, is in itself palpable history. Squalor and wit, rascality and canny observation, obscenity and refinement, innocent brutishness and pithiness of expression, the absence of hygiene and respect for cultural values, above all a texture of pullulating humanity are conveyed in every part of these *Brief Lives*, and not least in Roy Dotrice's consummately delightful performance.

Paul Taylor has learned how to turn the movement of modern dance into ballet—for which some may scorn him, but not I. His choreography, in which he has trained a small and attractive group of young dancers, is clear, clean, modestly incisive and humorous. His scope may be considered small but the precision and health, the lack of strain or false apocalypticism in his art are refreshing and somehow restful without being in the least soft. If at any past time Taylor's work may have been found lacking in form, the complaint can no longer be made.

On the evidence of his *The Journey of the Fifth Horse* (I do not know his earlier play *Harry, Noon and Night*) Ronald Ribman is something more than a "promising" dramatist. His latest piece, *The Ceremony of Innocence*, does not alter my estimation of him but strikes me as a detour on the road to his further development.

Ribman has sought here to write something approaching a traditional tragedy: the tragedy of a saintly ruler who attempts to use and impose humane reason on his state, so that it may not engage in the wasteful, senseless slaughter of war. The ruler is Ethelred, Anglo-Saxon King of England (986-1016). Nearly all the events of *The Ceremony of Innocence*, except that there was a war between the English and the Danes at that time, are fabrications. Why Ribman chose Ethelred as a hero I cannot guess, nor do I care. But in assaying a tragic theme one must write to the measure of great characters in a manner both personal and significant.

Ribman's play is literate enough, and the spectacle of a man struggling against the tide of history (which is usually a record of folly) is certainly disheartening, but it is an oft-repeated tale to which one must bring either new insight or new language. Otherwise one is sure to be swamped in a wave of banality or to become afflicted by "a plague of words." To think of this play as having any sharp relevance to the present world situation is to be pathetically ingenuous.

The Ceremony of Innocence is a dramatist's exercise (wholly sincere), but its ambition is misplaced. An author can say more by not trying to say so much. The production at American Place Theatre is impressively designed by Kert Lundell and well costumed by Willa Kim. The best feature of the evening is the generally good cast under Arthur Seidelman's direction, notably Donald Madden, an American actor who speaks and "reads" well without any Anglicized affectation and who seems to have grown considerably since his impetuous earlier ventures as Mark Antony and Hamlet.

Another exercise—this one a director's—is Joseph Papp's *Hamlet* at the Public Theater. It is a Hellzapoppin' *Hamlet* which aims to be funny and to elucidate the play in all its ambiguities for a mod audience.

The text is cut to one hour and forty minutes, and is sliced and rearranged for a series of vaudevillesque turns, each of them done as a demonstration of the play's dramatic meaning and for their own jocular sake.

Thus Hamlet wakes up in a coffinlike bed in handcuffs, and Horatio, dressed in concentration camp garb, is in chains throughout. (Isn't Denmark a prison?) Horatio, a constant cameraman, is killed. (The friendly intellectual observer always gets the dirty end of the stick.) Ophelia doesn't drown; instead she is killed by Hamlet—a symbolic truth.

Claudius reads the original Player King's lines (not bad) and he sleeps through the early part of the Play scene (good). Hamlet is at times his father's puppet. (This doesn't work.) Ophelia is something of a sexy dish. (Acceptable, if not wholly original.) She sings the songs of her madness nightclub fashion. (Possible, but though the evening's Ophelia—April Shawhan—has a fetching figure, she does not make the words intelligible.) Almost everything is spoken colloquially at breakneck speed: action takes precedence over poetry.

There is plenty of horseplay and extravagant nonsense—perhaps to prove that Shakespeare was not above such things in his roughhouse theatre. Hamlet as the Gravedigger speaks in a

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Puerto Rican accent to replace the country speech of the original. "To be or not to be" gets similar treatment.

There are a number of amusing moments: for example, Hamlet's unmistakable pass at Ophelia, interrupted by Polonius and followed by her lines "O my lord, my lord! I have been so affrighted," which play well as embarrassed excuses by a girl almost caught in the hay by her father. The characterization of Claudius as a grinning, gun-toting junta politician (engagingly acted by Ralph Waite) is a happy conceit. Many of the sight gags and japes prove duds; they are titillating at times —for instance when Claudius overhears Polonius' address to Laertes and murmurs "Right!" at the most Philistine bits of advice.

Still these games or Pop art variations on a theme become wearisome after fifty minutes. And if the "experiment" is to be taken at all seriously, it should be pointed out that (a) the play would be entirely unintelligible to a person not previously well acquainted with the material; and (b) to make the *points* of a play clear is not the same thing as making the play clear.

When Meyerhold in Moscow staged *The Inspector General* and Ostrovsky's *The Forest* in a manner all his own (disapproved by officialdom), his inventions were not only exhilarating but illuminating in each parallel to the original dramatic action, the result being an entirely coherent play. This, for all the occasional fun and scenic ingenuity, is not true of Papp's *Hamlet,* but I would not for a moment dream of becoming indignant over it. In fact, considering the hard work and amiable quality of Martin Sheen as Hamlet, and the spirited attack by the company as a whole, I must confess that I could submit myself to this *Hamlet* much more easily than to many of the star-studded productions I have seen.

Tragic Cakewalk

JULIUS NOVICK

The players, said Hamlet, are the abstract and brief chronicles of the time; but this country's resident professional theatres, for all their devotion to Shakespeare, have failed to take the hint. Whatever is going on right now in the Great Society has been reflected only rarely on their chastely subsidized stages, which have been consecrated to *Twelfth Night, The Importance of Being Earnest,* and other plays which may perhaps bore the subscribers, but are unlikely to offend them. And so the audience for the resident professional theatre has been limited to that 1 per cent or so of the population that is interested in genteel culture seeking.

One of the few resident-theatre magnates who is seriously concerned about this situation is Mrs. Zelda Fichandler, the founder of the Arena Stage in Washington, D. C. She has said:

> If we seek the Negro audience, America's new proletariat, we should integrate our acting companies and seek out plays that speak to Negro concerns. If we want high school and college-age audiences, we must compete with films in terms of the vividness and size of our work, its tempo and color, its immediacy of themes. If we wish to attract what Herbert Marcuse, the professor of philosophy at the University of California, calls "the new working class"—engineers, technicians, researchers and teachers—who are not economically depressed but sensorially dead, then we must attract them with the directness of our work, its abrasion, its physical energy, its source within life itself. . . .

Mrs. Fichandler has had the courage to put her theatre where her mouth is. The Arena Stage is currently offering the world première of *The Great White Hope,* a play by Howard Sackler based on the life of Jack Johnson, the first Negro heavyweight champion, who was hounded out of the country (or so Mr. Sackler has it) by the white power structure. Whether *The Great White Hope* is actually attracting Negroes, students and "the new working class" I am by no means sure—at the matinee I attended just before Christmas, the audience looked as genteel and stodgy as usual—but the production has all the qualities Mrs. Fichandler calls for in the passage quoted above.

Mr. Sackler has written a great sprawling chronicle in twenty scenes, laid between San Francisco and Budapest, as "Jack Jefferson" wanders the earth looking for a place where he can live in peace with his heavyweight title and his white mistress. Aristotle named "spectacle" as one of the parts of tragedy, and *The Great White Hope* is spectacular: it features a cakewalk, a prayer meeting, a voodoo ceremony, a funeral, and crowd scenes of all sorts.

It demands a large stage and a huge cast; very few theatres in this country could begin to muster the resources for it. The Arena Stage has recruited a company of more than sixty actors, augmenting its regular company with a number of well-known New York actors, and with some thirty local amateurs to fill out the crowds. This huge, heterogeneous mob has been directed by Edwin Sherin, the Arena's "Associate Producing Director," and he has molded it into a genuine ensemble of professional quality. Some of the actors are now and then defeated by the Arena's difficult acoustics, and some of them occasionally push a little too hard, but not a single performance is less than competent, and the major ones are admirable. James Earl Jones has the heavyweight physique, the heavyweight emotional power, and the mischievous but pointed irony needed to play Mr. Sackler's formidable hero; and Jane Alexander, a member of the Arena's permanent company, plays his mistress with conviction and grace.

The Arena's big rectangular stage, with the audience on all sides, is well suited (insofar as it is well suited to anything) to big, extroverted, fast-moving productions that do not require an elaborately detailed physical environment. Having directed fifteen Arena productions, Mr. Sherin knows how to use this stage. Yet there is no flash and dazzle for its own sake; the staging serves the play. The last scene especially, after Jack has lost his title, when the new champion, the triumphant "white hope," is carried off enthroned as Jack stands humiliated—both men bloody and dazed like sacrificial victims—this scene is corrosively moving, not as spectacle merely but as the resolution of the conflict that the play records, and the image of its hero's destiny.

Sackler's play is by no means one entire and perfect chrysolite. For one thing, it is far, far too long; I do not object to three-and-a-half-hour plays on principle, but this one repeats itself too many times. Furthermore, some of the important characters are unrealized in

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the writing; the champion's mistress, especially, is far too gracious, too faithful, and generally too perfect to be altogether persuasive. Even Jack Jefferson himself, until he is undermined by the persecutions he suffers, is somewhat too good to be true. For a wide array of additional reasons, a number of scenes fail to come off; the script "needs," as they say, "work."

But *The Great White Hope* matters very much all the same, just as it stands, because Sackler has gotten hold of a vitally significant piece of history, has realized just why it is significant, and has put that significance, in vivid human terms, on the stage. Jack Johnson/Jefferson, as Sackler depicts him, is not a well-behaved, serious-minded Negro like Booker T. Washington or Sidney Poitier; he mocks at white society, and he sleeps with a white woman. And this, in the land of the free and the home of the brave, is unendurable; America, Sackler suggests, absolutely cannot stand a "bad nigger."

For a while I sat watching the play and fighting its implications. I had it in mind to accuse Sackler of catering to the absurd, ugly and dangerous kind of Negro paranoia that considers family planning a genocidal plot against the colored races. But then I thought of Adam Clayton Powell and, even more, of Cassius Clay, who has recently been sentenced to a $10,000 fine and five years in prison for refusing induction into the army. The play is by no means a calm and balanced assessment of the situation, but it seems clear to me that what Sackler implies is at least basically true; ours is still a racist society. But whatever conclusion we come to, the play demands of us, in urgently dramatic terms, that we examine the whole question and our stake in it. I wish it could be shown in the schools, in the House of Representatives, and in other places where immature minds seek to cope with the problems of our day.

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FILMS / Robert Hatch

The roaring success of Mike Nichols' *The Graduate* is hardly surprising—he has built it on the dependable formula of Restoration comedy. I would not raise hopes too high: this Way of the Affluent World, to a script by Calder Willingham and Buck Henry, is consistently funny and frequently ironic, but it quite lacks the aphoristic wit of Sheridan or Congreve, and as it wears on it forsakes cynicism for chase and begins to resemble more Harold Lloyd than Mayfair dandy. Still, the spice of the piece, the source of its tension and laughter, is the confrontation of jaded maturity with the demanding innocence of youth. "Never trust anyone over 30" is a slogan that could have served the Restoration as well as it does our own time, and Nichols makes the old formula seem as topical as mini-skirts. Youth wins because its nerves are stronger and its needs simpler; it is not really a moral victory, but it serves that purpose.

If Nichols grasps but cannot hold the style of his model, it is because his older actors let him down. Dustin Hoffman has the right manner as the highly moral and readily seducible Graduate; he is at once gauche, disconcertingly direct and well armed by incredulity against the ploys of his elders. And Katherine Ross, as his destined sweetheart, is properly flouncy in a somewhat dim-witted righteousness. But Ann Bancroft, the seductress, invests a little too heavily in her lechery, and in general the attendant parents, spouses and family friends put too much heartfelt venom into what is essentially a masque of animal spirits. As a result, the film keeps threatening to turn the corner from Belgrave Square into Peyton Place.

Of course, I may be saddling Mr. Nichols with my own concept of his purpose; it is quite possible that he gave no thought at all to the 18th century and had in view no more than a cautionary tale for the 1960s. In that case, though, it is odd that his picture is so much more effective when it is outrageous that when it is outraged.

In a sense, the face of war opposite to Felix Greene's *Inside North Vietnam* is Pierre Schoendorffer's *The Anderson Platoon*. The parallel is not quite exact, since one picture describes how the people of North Vietnam stand up to the U.S. assault from the air, and the other shows how the American ground forces attack in the South. Still, the contrast in terms of morale and morality is too sharp to be overlooked.

When I reviewed Greene's film, I recalled the Battle of Britain. Anderson and his men evoke no analogy; I have never seen anything like them before, and wonder if there is any precedent. These are without question the most lethal infantry that have ever stalked the earth. They carry weapons so advanced (Vietnam, we have been told often enough, is a proving ground) that sometimes I could only guess their function; and the sound of battle is a plunking and buzzing quite unlike the crack and whistle of earlier combat. These shock troops take scarcely a step without checking for instruction on radio telephone; their needs and perils are constantly monitored by the hovering, ungainly helicopters (I cannot rid myself of the unwarranted notion that they are the scavenger kites of this war).

But at the heart of all this technological viciousness, the men look like bewildered, sick, abandoned children. They have no idea where the enemy lurks and couldn't identify him if he showed himself. They are constantly on the phone, but rarely know what they are to do; they are briefed by a senior officer, but for all useful purposes he is as ignorant as they (the morrow's objective is such and such hill, but why that hill and not some other?). A war that has no justification produces battles that have no purpose. Since we are not intent upon "conquering" South Vietnam, but only upon "liberating" it, the strategy does not move forward toward any goal—there is no Rhine, no Okinawa—but thrashes about, a killing scythe in the jungle. For all the firepower, the tolls are small; but as there is no objective, so it seems there are no limits, this slow grinding of the swamps and valleys can go on indecisively as long as any life at all remains there. All killing is stupid, but such killing is nasty as well. It is grevious that American youth should be forced to die at this ignorant work; we may learn before we are through to grieve even more bitterly for those who return home with their bodies still alive.

Schoendorffer's footage, made originally for French television, is objective, unblinking, but profoundly compassionate; there are no villains, only victims, at the front. The film bespeaks a remarkable rapport between photographers and soldiers, sustained no doubt because they showed a like courage in moments of great danger. Courage is so commonplace as to go almost unremarked in *The Anderson Platoon*; thus are men superior to their masters.

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